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ABSTRACT
I defend Martin Heidegger’s philosophy from Lee Braver’s contention that it espouses or entails
anti-realism, and instead contend that it strongly supports a robust realism. Realism is, in
essence, the metaphysical position which states that human beings are aware—or are capable of
being aware—of entities that exist independently of us. The counter-position, anti-realism,
sometimes equated with idealism, holds that this is not the case. Braver breaks down these
simplistic definitions into several more technical propositions, or “matrices,” and attempts to
show how Heidegger rejects the realism matrices in favor of their anti-realist counterparts. I will
likewise examine the matrices, arguing that Heidegger rejects all but one of them, but that,
contrary to the tradition, none of these are essential components of a realist position.
Furthermore, I argue that in rejecting these matrices, Heidegger is able to construct a
philosophical theory that embraces the most important matrix, and therefore the essence of
realism itself, in a novel way.

v

INTRODUCTION
The question of the realism/idealism problematic in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy has reached
its apex in recent years. Hubert Dreyfus, in his appropriation of Heideggerian thought into the
province of philosophy of mind, set the stage for a field of generally realist interpretations of
Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time. Following Heidegger’s so-called “ontological
difference”—the distinction between questions about the ontic, or the furniture of the universe,
and deeper issues of the ontological, the Being of those beings—a number of interpreters, most
notably Taylor Carman and Mark Wrathall, have recently disseminated a “middle way” reading
of Heidegger as an “ontic realist” but an “ontological idealist.” That is, entities are independently
of Dasein—Heidegger’s anti-Cartesian characterization of the human being—but the way that
they are, or rather what they are is, in a non-trivial sense, dependent on us, our ideas,
conceptions, etc.
In opposition to this somewhat standard view, a number of commentators, including
William Blattner, Cristina Lafont, and Herman Philipse, have argued Heidegger’s philosophy
betrays far stronger idealist components than Carman and his fellow travelers would admit.
Whether this idealist tendency manifests itself most pronouncedly in Heidegger’s analyses of
language or time, these philosophers argue that Being and Time in particular, but Heidegger’s
work in general, points back to a more thoroughly idealist position, one in which the very things
we encounter are, from the ground up, constituted by Dasein and its mode of life.
Lee Braver’s recent book, A Thing of this World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism,
has taken up this position in full force. In tracing anti-realism through the Continental tradition’s
major figures, Braver argues that a rejection of many realist propositions is not merely present in,
but characteristic of Continental thought. His treatment of Heidegger in particular attempts to
evince a conscious rejection of realism as part of an underlying agenda. In Braver’s own words,
“Being and Time as we have it […] is largely an analysis of realism—its origins, limitations,
dangers, and cure. Realism has inflicted philosophical trauma upon humanity for millennia, and
it must be dismantled before we can reconnect with our selves to achieve authenticity.”1
Braver’s approach is systematic. He introduces six “realism matrices,” each of which is
presented in the exacting terminology of some of philosophy’s greatest minds, and then presents
counterpart matrices that represent anti-realism and which find, as he argues, expression in the
history of Continental thought. These matrices, collectively, give voice to a thorough array of
hypotheses addressing different aspects of realism, as well as theories that seek to reformulate
the realism/idealism problematic in novel ways altogether.
This thesis will attempt to push back against Braver’s reading of Heidegger as a
thoroughgoing anti-realist, and will instead attempt to make the case that robustly realist
tendencies run deeply through Heidegger’s philosophy circa the Being and Time era. I will do
this primarily by dissecting four of Braver’s matrices, R2 Correspondence, R3 Uniqueness, R4
Bivalence, and R5 Passive Knower, and tangentially addressing R1 Independence. Ultimately, I
conclude that Heidegger rejects R2, R3, and R4, but the way he does so informs an acceptance of
R5. In the case of each rejection, I will argue first that these positions are not necessary
conditions for realism, and further that the way in which Heidegger rejects them does not imply
anything anti-realist.
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Chapter 1 will focus on R2 Correspondence, defending Heidegger’s non-traditional
theory of truth as fully realist in implication. Chapter 2 will continue by addressing the related
matrices of R3 Uniqueness and R4 Bivalence. I will make the case that Heidegger’s rejection of
these two leads to a novel way of viewing the thing-in-itself and our access to reality. The final
chapter will examine R5 Passive Knower, arguing that Heidegger sees phenomenology as
holding out the possibility of passive knowledge in opposition to the anti-realist Kantian
paradigm of human beings as A5 Active Knowers. In some sense, philosophy since Kant has
been a way of wrestling with the Kantian insight of the Active Knower, the implications of and
reactions to such a revolutionary thought. By arguing that R2, R3, and R4 are not essential
components of a thoroughgoing realism, I will therefore obliquely contend that R5 Passive
Knower is the only matrix of these that is essential for a realist to uphold, because it addresses
head-on the paradigm Kant formulated—that paradigm which has informed, perhaps even
determined, both Analytic and Continental thought ever since. This assessment of the essential
character of realism is along the same lines as Graham Harman’s, when he declares, “By ‘realist’
I mean [those philosophies that] reject the central teaching of Kant’s Copernican Revolution,
which turns philosophy into a meditation on human finitude and forbids it from discussing reality
in itself.”2 As I will argue, Heidegger’s philosophy attempts to lay out the conditions for
understanding just how Dasein has access to “reality itself.”
Finally, it should be stressed that this thesis will not constitute an argument for
Heidegger’s realism, but an argument for a brand of Heideggerian realism. I will not be claiming
that Heidegger considered himself a realist, saw his phenomenological ontology as a realist
philosophy, or would even have considered it appropriate to take such a reading away from his
work. Sheehan, in plotting a general cartography of Heidegger studies, divides the field into four
main positions, an ultra-orthodox and a “rejectionist wing,” between which stands a much more
diverse region of scholars, ranging from those in the generally orthodox camp to the “liberalassimilationists.” While the former seek to closely read and properly interpret Heidegger’s
thought, the latter, “beyond getting Heidegger right, […] seek to put his work into dialogue with
other contemporary philosophers and perhaps to amend or correct him in the process.”3 Though
this thesis will primarily seek to clarify Heidegger’s philosophical thought to defend it from antirealist construal, at the same time its spirit falls squarely into this latter camp. As contemporary
interpreters of Heidegger, I believe we should ultimately be less interested in what Heidegger
believed he believed, and more interested in what his philosophy affords us, what the depth of
his thought supports or implies. Instead of attempting to restrict ourselves merely to what
Heidegger claimed about his own work, I believe that, as students of that work, we should look
to those of his insights that are plausible and profound, and carry on along those lines. In this
thesis, I argue that such plausible and profound insights in Heidegger’s work point to a robust
form of realism.

2
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CHAPTER 1: TRUTH AS UNCOVERING
In this chapter, I lay out Heidegger’s theory of truth and explore aspects of its implications for
the realism/idealism problematic. I begin in section 1.1 by providing a brief overview of
Heidegger’s theory of truth and how it differs from the traditional account, correspondence. The
next section, 1.2, continues by analyzing Tugendhat’s well-known critique of Heidegger’s
theory, arguing that Tugendhat has simply misunderstood Heidegger by ignoring crucial
passages of Being and Time. Finally, section 1.3 briefly examines a “problem passage” in Being
and Time, typically seen as committing Heidegger to an anti-realist position regarding truth. I
argue that not only does this passage not entail anything anti-realist in nature, but that its
archetypical critics cannot escape their own objections.
1.1 Preliminary: Heidegger’s Account of Truth
1.1.1
From the time of Aristotle, the so-called “correspondence theory” has, in one form or another,
been the predominant account of truth. Though the theory has appeared in different forms, these
are merely variations on the same basic theme; the Thomist characterization of truth as
“adaequation rei et intellectus” (the correspondence of the thing with the intellect) is, in essence,
the same as the prevailing contemporary description of truth as the correspondence of a
proposition to matters of fact. As Hilary Putnam expresses it, “Truth involves some sort of
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things.”1
Lee Braver codifies this as his R2 realism matrix.
Heidegger’s account of truth, on the other hand, rejects the idea that truth lies in the
correspondence of one thing—whether the intellect or a proposition—with the world, and as a
result denies that an assertion or judgment is the proper locus of truth. Instead, Heidegger
identifies truth as aletheia, a Greek word meaning “un-hiddenness,” sometimes translated as
uncovering or unconcealment. Truth as aletheia, then, is much more fundamental than
propositional truth, a part of Dasein’s (human being’s) basic Being-in-the-world. As a rejection
of R2 Correspondence, Heidegger’s theory thus qualifies under Braver’s thesis as an instance of
an anti-realist position, which he dubs A2.
However, it is important to note that this is not exactly a simple rejection of the
correspondence account of truth, nor does it deny that propositions can be properly said to be
true or false. Braver admits that seeing this theory as a flat-out dismissal of correspondence is
somewhat erroneous: “We can see that Heidegger does accept R2 Correspondence Truth, but
redefines and limits it. It is only true of present-at-hand objects, and it necessarily presupposes
the more primordial truth of uncovering or disclosure (A2), which he calls aletheia.”2 The point
that Heidegger is making is that there is a much more fundamental occurrence that can be
properly called truth, and on which the truth of propositions is already reliant. We can crudely
characterize Heidegger’s relocation of truth from its traditional home in propositions to, for lack
of a better word, perception itself. Understanding why Heidegger makes this move from
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propositional truth to aletheic truth involves understanding how the former is dependent on the
latter.
1.1.2
Dahlstrom refers to the correspondence theory of truth as hinging on a particular assumption,
what he calls the “logical prejudice.” This is not an attack on logic itself or its veracity, but rather
on the veracity of the age-old model that says truth is something that occurs in logic, that it is
first and foremost, or even solely, something about propositions:
The specific logical prejudice in question is a certain way of speaking and
thinking about truth or, equivalently, a theory of suitable uses of ‘truth’ and its
cognates that is traditionally construed as a cornerstone of logic. Logic typically
begins with analysis of assertions (propositions, statements, judgments, or the
like) and their possible combinations as the elements of any scientific theory that
is open to verification or falsification. In other words, logic assumes that
assertions and their kin are the site of truth, indeed in the sense that they must be
in place for there to be anything that might be termed the ‘truth.’3
But for Heidegger this “logical prejudice” misses that on which it is, in the first place, dependent.
Classically, in order for a proposition P to be true, some fact F must pertain and P must refer to
F. But Heidegger’s point is that in order to refer to F at all, P must already be letting F be
disclosed. When I say, “The coin is round,” my assertion points out an entity, the coin, as being a
certain way (in this example, round). But more basic than the assertion corresponding to the coin
adequately is that the coin is being revealed in the assertion. Suppose that the coin is in fact not
round, but square. Then my assertion that it is round may, in a rather minimal sense, bring
attention to the entity, but it does not reveal—or, more technically, uncover—the entity, because
the how of its being, the way it is, remains passed over by the assertion. Instead, anyone who
hears my assertion and also sees the coin would be perplexed. In this way, assertion, as a means
of communication, of discourse (Rede), is not being fulfilled, and the coin is covered over,
remains hidden within the discourse.4
But suppose the coin is, in fact, round. Then my assertion has uncovered the coin,
showing it as that which it is. In order for there to be talk of any “correspondence” between the
statement and the coin, one must already presuppose the coin’s being revealed. The truth of the
assertion, therefore, is parasitic on what we might call the “communication” of the pertaining of
F to the one who would make the assertion. Statements uncover, but this uncovering that
statements perform rests on the uncovering that happens in Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, and this
means on, among other, richer things, “perception,” very broadly construed. Heidegger says in
his essay “On the Essence of Truth”:
A statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for
only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for
presentative correspondence. […] But if the correctness (truth) of statements
becomes possible only through this openness of comportment, then what first
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makes correctness possible must with more original right be taken as the essence
of truth.5
‘Uncovering’ thus becomes for Heidegger the primordial essence of truth, and ‘openness’ the
theme for the possibility of truth. Entities are available for discovery and Dasein is receptive to
their availability. Heidegger later expanded on this idea of openness from just the open
comportment of Dasein to a “fourfold unitary openness”: the openness between thing and
Dasein, of Dasein to the thing, of the region between the two, and of Dasein to other Dasein such
that an entity’s uncoveredness can be discursively conveyed, as in assertion.6 We will return in
the next chapter to the implications of this idea of the basic accessibility of entities.
As Krell summarizes, “The upshot is that a discovery of beings that lets them be seen is
always presupposed in all correspondence or adequation of judgment and states of affairs.”7 It is
this relocation of truth, from its traditional site in assertion, to “uncovering,” that Ernst
Tugendhat saw as problematic, and critiqued. In order to guard against an anti-realist
interpretation of Heidegger’s theory of truth as uncovering, let us analyze Tugendhat’s critique
and determine where it goes wrong.
1.2 On Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Phenomenon and Semblance
1.2.1
Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time, is both deep and difficult. It also has great breadth:
the topics that the text addresses range from fundamental ontology to psychological
anthropology. Due to the depth and breadth of its subject matter, Being and Time displays a
rigorous, cumulative methodology. For this reason, any reading of the text must itself be rigorous
and cumulative. But with its many famous, influential, and controversial passages, it is easy to
simply dive into Being and Time without the compass that is its lengthy Introduction. When it
comes to analysis of Heidegger’s phenomenology, such a move proves to be a great error. This is
because the Introduction itself includes many passages that are not merely illuminating, but
indispensably necessary for understanding what is to come in the book proper. Many
fundamental terminological distinctions are laid out that, if ignored, will lead to disastrous
misinterpretations in far-flung sections.
There is perhaps no better example of just such an exegetical catastrophe in the oft-read
secondary literature than Ernst Tugendhat’s highly influential essay “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth.”
In it, Tugendhat attempts to show that, as Richard Wolin succinctly puts it, “the central problem
with Heidegger’s concept of truth stems from its ‘overgeneralization.’”8 In extending, as
Tugendhat says, “the concept of truth to all uncovering and every disclosedness,”9 Heidegger
allegedly leaves no room in his conception for real falsity. Wolin, a translator and defender of
Tugendhat, claims that instead “the difference between a ‘true’ uncovering or disclosedness of
entities—that is, one that would capture the entity as it is in itself—from uncovering or

5

Heidegger, M. “On the Essence of Truth.” Basic Writings of Martin Heidegger, p. 122.
Heidegger, M. Basic Questions of Philosophy, p. 18-19.
7
Krell, D. Introduction. “On the Essence of Truth.” Basic Writings of Martin Heidegger, p. 113.
8
Wolin, R. Introduction. “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth.” The Heidegger Controversy, p. 245.
9
Tugendhat, E. “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth.” The Heidegger Controversy, p. 249.
6

5

disclosedness as such is effaced.”10 That Wolin uses such language—“as it is in itself”—to talk
about what uncovering fails to distinguish will prove ironic. This is because what ‘uncovering’ is
for Heidegger just means that an entity has been shown “in itself,” and the counter-concept to
uncovering, ‘covering over,’ wherein lies falsity, occurs when an entity is shown, but precisely
not “in itself.”
Nevertheless, this is Tugendhat’s allegation, that Heidegger cannot account—or
adequately account—for falsity. Let us examine it more closely.
1.2.2
To begin with, let us note that Tugendhat admits at the outset he is only focusing on §44 of Being
and Time: “In order to keep the interpretation within a manageable frame, I will limit myself to a
specific passage, section 44 in Being and Time. Here, Heidegger develops his concept of truth for
the first time.”11 This admission, as I will show, is both pertinent and telling, and casts great
doubt on Tugendhat’s thesis. The assertion that this is the first place Heidegger develops his
concept of truth is, incidentally, simply incorrect, and this is precisely why limiting the
discussion to §44 alone proves such a critical error.
However, before the severity of this oversight can be demonstrated, let us look at the
heart of Tugendhat’s reading of §44. His main thesis is that Heidegger surreptitiously modifies
Husserl’s own account of truth, and in the process loses that which, as has been recognized since
time immemorial, makes truth distinctive—that it has a character of preserving bona fides, so to
speak. That is, a theory of truth that cannot account for falsity is no real theory of truth at all. So,
how does Heidegger thusly modify Husserl’s account of truth? According to Tugendhat, he does
so by successively reducing it until it says something far different from what Husserl intended.
This is accomplished in two steps, he argues: first, by demonstrating that what makes an
assertion true is that it ‘uncovers’ beings as they are in themselves, and then by covertly
subtracting from this thesis until ‘uncovering’ of all sorts, whether of the entities “in themselves”
or otherwise, is conflated with truth.
The way in which Heidegger’s theory differs from Husserl’s can only be
discerned from the different yet equivalent variants that he places alongside the
first definition. The first definition reads: the assertion is true if it points out and
uncovers the entity ‘just as it is in itself.’ Here, this ‘just as’ [‘So-Wie’] is
emphasized by Heidegger. Clearly, this ‘just as’ is essential for the truth relation,
for it denotes the agreement between the entity just as it is uncovered in the
assertion with the same entity ‘as it is in itself.’12
The definition Tugendhat appears to be pointing to is as follows from Being and Time: “The
entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself; that is to say, it shows that it,
in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being—just as it gets
uncovered as being.”13 But Tugendhat says that Heidegger drops this ‘as it is’ in the second
formulation:
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It is all the more surprising that Heidegger, without rational justification, now
advances a formulation in which the ‘just as’ is absent. He says, ‘To say that an
assertion is true means: it uncovers the entity in itself.’ The reformulation is
however completely legitimate; it corresponds, moreover, entirely to Husserl’s
theory. For since the agreement, if it is correct, is an identity, if the assertion
points out the entity as it is in itself, one can simply say: it points out the entity in
itself. The ‘just as’ is implicit in the ‘in itself.’14
Perhaps notably, MacQuarrie and Robinson chose not to translate this definition as Tugendhat
states it; their translation gives the Heidegger citation above as “To say that an assertion ‘is true’
signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself.”15 It is possible that they, like Tugendhat, saw
the two formulations as fully equivalent, and the “reduction” therefore as entirely justified. In
any case, the real turn comes when Heidegger states the definition a third time:
However, in the third formulation Heidegger now carries the simplification one
step further: he also expunges—once more without rational justification—the ‘in
itself.’ That an assertion is true now merely means: it uncovers the entity.
Thereby, the following thesis is reached: “The Being-true (truth) of the assertion
must be understood as Being-uncovering.” With the use of this latter expression,
Heidegger has clearly distanced himself from Husserl and attained his own
concept of truth— which he henceforth maintains only in this formulation.16
Tugendhat recognizes the legitimacy of the first reduction, but not the second reduction.
However, he only does this by ignoring pertinent passages of the Introduction to Being and Time,
and has therefore not achieved an understanding of exactly what Heidegger means by this term
of art, ‘uncovering.’ Just as with the first reduction, the second and third definitions are entirely
equivalent, because ‘uncovered’ just means ‘being shown as it is in itself.’ I submit that the
reduction from the second definition to the third is simply a rhetorical move on Heidegger’s part,
just as the reduction from the first to the second clearly is; it is meant to bring to bear the full
force of Heidegger’s concept of ‘uncovering,’ to highlight all that is entailed by the term, in the
same way that the first reduction draws attention to the fact that the ‘just as’ is implicit in the ‘in
itself.’ The first, second, and third formulations are all in fact equivalent as stated. The textual
evidence for this equivalence in Being and Time will be given presently, and involves
understanding Heidegger’s phenomenological distinction between ‘phenomenon’ and
‘semblance’ in a crucial passage of the Introduction.
1.2.3
Heidegger provides his definitions of ‘phenomenon’ and ‘semblance’ at the end of the
Introduction to Being and Time in the segment “The Concept of Phenomenon,” and gives them a
wider framework within his phenomenology in the following segments, “The Concept of the
Logos” and “The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology.” And, as I will attempt to show,
appreciating these sections is hardly a luxury if one is to understand Heidegger’s theory of truth,
or even his phenomenology at large.
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The first section, tracing the etymology of the word ‘phenomenon’ through the original
Greek, arrives at a clear definition: “Thus we must keep in mind that the expression
‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself [Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende], the
manifest.”17 He goes on to state that an entity can be shown in itself in myriad ways, “depending
in each case on the kind of access we have to it.”18 He uses this fact to more generally state that
entities can even be shown not in themselves in different ways: “Indeed, it is even possible for an
entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not. When it shows itself in this way, it
‘looks like something or other.’ This kind of showing-itself is what we call ‘seeming.’”19 Thus,
he defines ‘semblance’ as a derivative of ‘phenomenon,’ its “privative modification.” The
segment “The Concept of Phenomenon” goes on to define a third category, ‘appearance,’ which I
will not focus on. Suffice it to say that, in ‘appearance,’ an entity is neither shown in itself nor
shown not in itself—the entity is not shown at all, but rather announced by way of an entity
which does show itself.
To illustrate clearly the structural distinctions between ‘phenomenon,’ ‘semblance,’ and
‘appearance,’ and for purposes of easy reference, we can construct a simple table:

Phenomenon

Semblance

Shows itself
In itself

Not in itself

Appearance
Does not show itself

What, then is the relationship between ‘phenomenon’ and ‘uncovering?’ Heidegger gives it in
“The Preliminary Concept of Phenomenology”: “Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to
‘phenomenon.’”20 He goes on to explicitly describe semblance as a state of being-covered up.21
17
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That is, an entity is uncovered when it is a ‘phenomenon,’ when it shows itself in itself, and is
covered over or covered up when it is a ‘semblance,’ when it does not show itself in itself.
It seems obvious then that for Heidegger ‘phenomenon’ and ‘uncovering’ are inextricably
mutually defined. That which is uncovered in an uncovering qualifies, in virtue of its beinguncovered, as a ‘phenomenon.’ We can thus amend our table:

Phenomenon
Shows itself
In itself
Uncovering
Truth

Semblance

Appearance
Does not show itself

Not in itself
Covering over
Falsity

The task of phenomenology is to sift through the semblances, “to let that which shows itself be
seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”22 Phenomena—things as
they are—can be, and indeed, usually are, hidden from view. For this reason, Heidegger stresses
that phenomenology is a worthwhile field of inquiry: “just because the phenomena are
proximally and for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology.”23 If uncovering
were as broadly defined as Tugendhat argues it is, and as a term of art simply designated
‘showing’ or givenness of any kind, then as Heidegger sees it there would be no need for
phenomenology, for there would be no covering over at all. But this is patently not his position.
As he says, “‘Being false’ amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up: putting something
in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something
which it is not.”24 If this is the characterization of covering over, or falsity, then uncovering, its
opposite, must be when something is not “passed off as something which it is not,” but instead is
“shown as it is in itself.” If there was no distinction, then it would hardly make sense for
Heidegger to, on several occasions in Being and Time, liken uncovering to “robbery,”
characterizing truth is something to be “wrested” from encounters with entities. As he says, “It is
therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered,
defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its uncoveredness again and
again.”25
It seems clear, then, that when Heidegger reduces the formulation “uncovered just as it is
in itself” to simply “uncovered,” he has not changed his conception of what is going on in the
being-true of an assertion at all; the first formulation was simply redundant, likely for the sake of
illumination. When Tugendhat says, then, that “what constitutes the truth of the assertion appears
not to be the fact that the entity is uncovered by the assertion, but rather how it is uncovered by
21
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it—namely, ‘as it is in itself’”26 and on this basis concludes that Heidegger dispenses with that
qualification in the final formulation, thus changing the meaning of what it means to be a true
assertion, he has entirely misunderstood from the outset what ‘uncovering’ is. There is no “how”
to an entity being uncovered, at least not for the purposes of the topic of truth versus falsity.
Instead, uncovering itself is a particular way in which a showing can occur. Uncovering is a truth
showing of an entity. When Heidegger says, “What is to be demonstrated is solely the Beinguncovered of the entity in itself—that entity in the ‘how’ of its uncoveredness,”27 this signifies
that uncoveredness is a how—the entity is shown in an uncovering way, a way that uncovers it.
But Tugendhat continues along the same line by saying that “Only because, for
Heidegger, even the truth of the assertion does not lie in how it uncovers but in the fact that it
uncovers in general, can he now and without further justification transpose truth to all
disclosedness as such.”28 ‘Disclosure’ is another term of art for Heidegger, essentially identical
in function with ‘uncovering.’ In any case, the error here is the same as above, and by this point
it should be clear that ‘showing’ and ‘uncovering/disclosure’ are by no means the same thing in
Heidegger’s phenomenology, that Tugendhat missed this, that he did so in virtue of ignoring
other important sections of Being and Time, and that his entire argument turns on the fruit of
such neglect.
1.2.4
But the full breadth of Tugendhat’s oversight of crucial aspects of Heidegger’s theory does not
end there. He acknowledges the possibility of this equivalence between the first and third
formulations as a defense Heidegger could provide29 (though only as a possible defense, rather
than one which the text does in fact support). His counter-argument to this defense involves
claiming that it turns on an ambiguity in the text between ‘uncovering’ and ‘pointing out’:
In the first instance, uncovering stands for pointing out (apophainesthai) in
general. In this sense every assertion—the false as well as the true can be said to
uncover. Nevertheless, Heidegger employs the word in a narrow and pregnant
sense according to which a false assertion would be a covering up rather than an
uncovering. In this case it goes without saying that the truth lies in beinguncovered; however, what does uncovering now mean if it no longer signifies
pointing out in general? How is aletheia to be differentiated from apophansis?
Heidegger gives no answer to this question.30
But, again, if one turns to the Introduction, there is no ambiguity. Uncovering never stands for
pointing out in general; on the contrary, ‘pointing out’ stands for a specific way in which a
“letting-something-be-seen” can occur. Pointing out (apophansis) is a mode of showing
pertaining specifically to discourse (legein). Beings can be uncovered apart from discourse, but
in discourse, assertions can, in their own right, either let beings be seen in themselves or not. In
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the case of the former, the beings are uncovered in this derivative sense, in the latter they are
covered over.
As Heidegger says, Logos is a mode of letting something be seen31—differentiated from
other modes such as perception. Because it lets things be seen, logos can be true or false, but it is
not the “primary ‘locus’ of truth,”32 and therefore, apophansis is not uncovering itself, but a
specific mode in which uncovering might or might not occur. This is the nature of the distinction
Heidegger draws, and at which we hinted in 1.1.2, between aletheia and apophansis; the latter is
way of letting entities be seen, and can be true or false, but only within the milieu of discourse. If
I walk into a room in which there is a four-legged stool and I make the assertion, “The chair has
three legs,” the assertion points out the entity, but fails to uncover it. In failing to be pointed out
as it is, the entity remains concealed, not uncovered, undisclosed. If I instead asserted, “The chair
has four legs,” such an utterance would point out the entity in the room as it is, and, in doing so,
would uncover it in the context of the discourse. The entity in the room is more fundamentally
uncovered in perception, but in talking about the entity, it receives an “as-structure” (i.e. as being
“a chair”) and in this context is made available for further discourse either by myself or by
anyone else to whom the assertion is presented.33
Oddly enough, Tugendhat acknowledges exactly this later in the essay: “in Being and
Time the word ‘uncover’ terminologically stands for every disclosedness of worldly entities: and
thus not only the disclosedness of the assertion which ‘points out,’ but also for the circumspect
disclosedness of concern.”34 How, then can Tugendhat say that Heidegger “fails to expressly
differentiate between these concepts: that is, between the broad and the narrow meaning of
uncovering”? As stated before, Heidegger uses ‘uncover’ in the “broad meaning” only once as a
rhetorical device, with the understanding being that ‘uncover just as it is in itself” is redundant
and just means “uncover.” Since Tugendhat himself recognizes the distinction in Being and Time
between ‘pointing out’ (the so-called “broad meaning” of uncovering) and “uncovering” proper
(the so-called “narrow meaning), then he cannot sensibly maintain Heidegger meant what he is
taking him to mean.
The problem here seems to be, again, that Tugendhat misunderstands ‘disclosure’ to be
identical with ‘showing.’ If we take ‘disclosure’ and ‘showing’ to be equivalent, then
Tugendhat’s claim that Heidegger cannot account for the distinction between ‘uncovering’ and
‘pointing out’ seems fair. But as shown in 1.1.3, ‘showing’ is itself something of a term of art for
Heidegger, and refers to any givenness, true or false. But Heidegger consistently uses
‘disclosure’ interchangeably with ‘uncovering,’ and, as we have seen, uncovering is a special
kind of showing.
Tugendhat continues: “If the truth of the assertion lies according to paragraph (a) in
uncovering, then it follows, he concludes, that all encounters with worldly entities are actually
‘true.’”35 He locates this claim on H. p. 220, but no passage making this exact statement exists
there. Instead, he seems to be referring to Heidegger’s remark that “Circumspective concern, or
even that concern in which we tarry and look at something, uncovers entities-within-the-
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world.”36 While it may look like in the latter case, that when we “tarry and look at something,”
we uncover entities, is justifying Tugendhat’s claim, in fact it is not. “Tarrying” [‘Verweilen’] is,
again, another term of art for Heidegger, and, again, Tugendhat does not bother to appreciate it
as such. When Heidegger talks about ‘tarrying,’ he does not mean to signify the common idle
glance, and therefore does not mean to say that just any encounter uncovers. Note that in this
remark Heidegger uses “concern” as a way of describing both modes of encounter,
“circumspective concern,” and “tarrying.” Contrast this with concern’s antagonist, mere
curiosity; Heidegger says, “That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in
which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.”37 That is, in
curiosity, unlike in concernful encounters, semblance reigns.
Now, on the section on curiosity, Heidegger explicitly distinguishes it with tarrying:
Therefore, curiosity is characterized by a specific way of not tarrying alongside
what is closest. Consequently, it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly,
but rather seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing
encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of
distraction. […] Rather it concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order
to have known. Both this not tarrying in the environment with which one
concerns oneself, and this distraction by new possibilities, are constitutive items
for curiosity.38
In this passage, we are obviously meant to understand that curiosity is something of a fallen state
of the modes of concerfulness, including tarrying, in which the concern does not attend to
entities or the Being of entities, but rather just with “the constant possibility of distraction.” In
these contexts, then, we can see that tarrying certainly bears no resemblance to what we might
call idle glancing, and is not meant to stand in for just any showing, or just any common
givenness. To say, then, that “tarrying” uncovers does not mean, nor does it entail, what
Tugendhat says it does. Contrary to his claim, it is not the case for Heidegger that all encounters
with worldly entities are true.39
This, as we have seen, manifests itself as the central error of Tugendhat’s essay, which
leads him to conclusions like, “This difference intrinsic to self-manifestation between an
immediately apparent givenness and the thing itself is not taken into consideration by
Heidegger” and “the difference between givenness in general and self-givenness escapes him.”40
But, as we have shown, these and equivalent statements are patently false. Heidegger indeed
recognizes that there is a distinction between “givenesss as such and the possibility of a superior
mode of givenness”; further, he specifically defines truth, uncovering, as a superior mode of
givenness—the occurrence of something showing itself in itself (phenomena), as differentiated
from the occurrence of something showing itself not in itself (semblance).
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1.3 The “Problem Passage”: Truth and Dasein
1.3.1
We have examined Tugendhat’s critique primarily as a way of elucidating Heidegger’s theory of
truth. However, we have done so in a “naïve” way. That is, we have not at all examined the
implications of this theory of truth as uncovering, nor the wider context of the philosophy in
which it occurs. We have merely sought to defend the theory against misunderstandings about
what it is stating.
We have not addressed, for example, Tugendhat’s criticism of how Heidegger locates
truth relative to Dasein. If, as Tugendhat rightly reads, “All uncovering of worldly entities is
grounded […] in the disclosedness of the world,” then, as he likewise rightly understands,
“Heidegger can now conclude, the disclosedness of Dasein itself as Being-in-the-world—as the
disclosedness of it world—is ‘the most primordial phenomenon of truth’”41 For Tugendhat, as
for many others, this proves problematic. If the proper and primordial locus of truth rests in the
disclosedness of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, then there is no truth without Dasein. This leads
us to our “problem passage,” one oft-quoted as evidence that Heidegger promotes a sort of antirealism about truth, a form of relativism, even. It reads:
Disclosedness is a kind of Being which is essential to Dasein. ‘There is’ truth only
in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when
Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed. Newton’s laws, the
principle of contradiction, any truth whatsoever—these are true only so long as
Dasein is. Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any
after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and
uncoveredness, cannot be.42
On the face of it, this certainly seems radical and anti-realist. As I will attempt to argue, however,
it is in fact not.
In order to see this, it is necessary that we take a critical view as to why one would see
this as radical, anti-realist, or relativistic in the first place. Instead of taking this reaction at face
value as worthwhile, we should ask the question as to what causes it. There are two likely
candidates, and both are probably at play: (i) if there can be no truth when there is no Dasein,
then there can be no fact when there is no Dasein, and (ii) it should be possible to evaluate the
truth or falsity of a given proposition even when Dasein does not exist. But neither of these
objections holds much water, as will be shown in the next section.
1.3.2
Firstly, let us note that Heidegger roundly rejects the idea that because truth only exists so long
as there is Dasein, there are no facts when Dasein does not exist. In the same section as the above
quotation, he attempts to guard against such misunderstandings by stating, “To say that before
Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such
entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. […] Once entities have been
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uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were.”43 That
is, the factical existence of such entities as posited by, for example, scientific theories is in no
way affected by Dasein’s existence or positing about them. Quarks existed before the theories
that point them out, and therefore states of affairs having to do with quarks pertained before
those theories. So there is a strong distinction here on Heidegger’s part between ‘truth’ on the
one hand and ‘fact’ on the other, and in distinguishing them Heidegger maintains the spirit of the
realism matrix Braver calls R1 Independence: “The world consists of some fixed totality of
mind-independent objects.”44
But isn’t this counter to the orthodox understanding of truth, as essentially equivalent to
fact? And doesn’t distinguishing them trivialize the concept of truth? Not at all; the distinction
between truth and fact is well established, even in the classical notion. How, for example, could
one even make sense of the correspondence theory of truth if we did not make such a distinction?
Correspondence theory, whether the Aristotelian, Thomist, Kantian, or even the prevailing
contemporary notion in Analytic philosophy, claims that the intellect or the proposition
corresponds with the world, with reality, states of affairs, facts of the matter, etc. In the
Tractatus, for example, Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes between a fact and a proposition, and
therefore, obviously, between a fact and a true proposition:
2
What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
2.1
We picture facts to ourselves.
2.222 The agreement or disagreement of [a picture’s] sense with reality constitutes its
truth or falsity.
2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
3
A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4
A thought is a proposition with a sense.45
The definition of correspondence truth that Putnam gives, and which Braver quotes as the
paradigm expression of the theory, likewise distinguishes between fact and truth. To restate the
definition: “Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs
and external things and sets of things.”46 Here Wittgenstein and Putnam are just moving
alongside the representational scheme that correspondence theory has sketched in one form or
another since Aristotle. In accordance with this scheme, when there is no correspondence, or the
correspondence is inadequate—that is, the proposition is false—there remain facts, and the
nature of the facts themselves are unchanged, while truth is nowhere to be found. By all
accounts, then, one can have fact without truth, and indeed the correspondence theory of truth
itself only gets off the ground in the first place precisely by understanding the difference. What,
then, is so strange about saying that fact and truth are distinct? If Heidegger is indeed trivializing
truth by doing so, then he is in good company.
Let’s now turn to the second of the previously mentioned reasons why one would
dismiss, out of hand, Heidegger’s contention that there is truth only so long as there is Dasein.
This objection rests on the idea that a proposition should be in principle truth-evaluable
regardless of whether Dasein is around to actually evaluate it. There is, on the face of it, no real
disagreement here between Heidegger and the critic. That is, if Dasein disappeared from the face
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of the earth tomorrow, on the day after tomorrow such propositions as Dasein makes use of
today could be evaluated even then.
But the important thing to note here is that propositions are not just free-floating things,
cosmic abstractions that Dasein picks from the sky like low-hanging fruit. They are embedded in
concrete existence by virtue of the fact that they are constructed out of concepts, which are
themselves defined and delimited by cultural, social and historical situatedness—what Heidegger
calls Dasein’s facticity. A concept is a human concept. What it means for a thing to be a chair is
defined by, and stands in relation to, all the things Dasein can, should, or would do with a thing
of such character. The point here is that propositions are, of course, concept-laden, and thus part
of a practice. Evaluating them, then, means, to a certain extent, being sensitive to the nature of
that practice. This is not merely a Heideggerian position, but one that is, or should be, condoned
by Analytic philosophers of language who take seriously Wittgenstein’s private language
argument, or semantic externalism since Kripke and Putnam. In these philosophies of language,
the meaning of a word or group of words is not determined—at least not wholly—by the internal
state or beliefs of the speaker, but by external things, such as a practice shared by competent
users of the language. As Robert Brandom says of this pragmatist account, “The background
against which the conceptual activity of making things explicit is intelligible is taken to be
implicitly normative essentially social practice.”47 So in the case of a statement like “The cat is
on the mat,” when there is no practice, because there is no Dasein, there can be no concepts at
play. As a result, there is no proposition at all, just a string of symbols. There is no way to
evaluate the string “the cat is on the mat,” because no proposition is actually being presented.
We are not merely saying that in such cases “the cat is on the mat” has no sense because
there is no one to utter the sentence that expresses the proposition, that there is no one there to
make the flatus voci—the sound. This would be a trivial argument. Rather, our point here is that
there is no one to make the proposition itself. In keeping with the differentiation between a
sentence and a proposition, or words and their meanings, we are here making the argument that
without Dasein there can be no meaning ascribed to a group of words. That is, there can be no
interpretation assigned to a symbol, or group of symbols, without an interpreter. Thus, to ask the
question, “Is the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘the cat is on the mat’ true or false when
Dasein does not exist?” is to speak nonsense. Without Dasein assigning an interpretation to the
words “cat,” or “mat,” or “on,” or even “is,” we would be asking one to evaluate the bare
symbols as true or false, which is obviously absurd. The meaning of the symbols is what must be
evaluated.
In a sense, propositions, as loci of meaning, mirror Dasein’s understanding, its concepts
and its interpretations. Without Dasein, then, nothing can appear in the mirror. How are we to
even get off the ground to evaluate “The cat is on the mat” as true or false if Dasein and its social
normative practices are not first available to give meaning to the symbols? Imagine instead if I
asked you whether “hgygt slighy o imea” is true or false when Dasein is not around. To be
befuddled by the question is no different than being befuddled when it relates to any other string
of symbols. It is an absurdity to think that because “the cat is on the mat” has a standard
interpretation that therefore if no one was around to provide that interpretation in the first
place—to give the words meaning—the string of symbols itself would be truth-bearing. Only
Dasein can make a proposition—that is, assign a string of symbols a semantic interpretation. The
statement is just a composition of symbols; a robot could utter them, or a computer be
47
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programmed to display them on a monitor. The bare words do not contain the meanings. But a
proposition is composed of concepts, each being what it is within a context of cultural, historical,
social facticity—Dasein’s facticity. Without Dasein in this sense, these words are just flatus voci.
One could say: “But ‘p’ does have an interpretation assigned to it, and that interpretation,
once assigned, is not dependent on Dasein’s existence. Tomorrow, Dasein could cease to exist,
yet ‘p’ would continue to mean what it means. The fact that an interpretation was assigned would
not be ‘retroactively’ redacted.” But such an objection would miss the point. The assignment of
an interpretation in the first place is dependent on the existence of Dasein, and therefore any
future interpretation the sentence has, whether Dasein exists in that future or not, remains
dependent on the fact that at one point Dasein existed and assigned that interpretation to that
string of symbols. This is a necessary condition for one to make use of such an interpretation in a
Dasein-less future. The truth-evaluability of the proposition, then, is fully dependent on Dasein.
1.3.3
To say that when there is no Dasein there is no truth is in no way, shape, or form equivalent to—
or even remotely like—saying that when there is no Dasein there are no facts, no states of affairs.
Heidegger does not maintain this, as he clearly states in his passage on Newton's equations. Nor
can his critics maintain that this falls out of his philosophy despite his cautions—at least, not
without subjecting their own theory of truth to the same objections. Truth is generally
recognized, by even correspondence theory, as a far more exotic specimen than just ‘fact.’
So we have demonstrated firstly that fact and truth are distinct and that this distinction is
not an arbitrary one we have made ourselves without cause, but rather is a prominent one,
essential to the very cohesiveness of the traditional correspondence theory of truth. Secondly,
though, we have demonstrated that Heidegger’s claim “truth exists only so long as Dasein exists”
is not one that philosophies of language endorsing externalism or deflationary (primarily antiPlatonist) metaphysics—such as those in Analytic philosophy after Wittgenstein—are in a
position to move against. All this serves to show that if this “problem passage” seems, at first
glance, relativistic or anti-realist, in fact nothing could be further from the truth. Nothing is lost
for a realist by making Heidegger’s move from the correspondence theory of truth to the aletheic
conception.
1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have laid out Heidegger’s theory of truth as uncovering, and, hopefully,
demonstrated that one can make sense of even its most seemingly radical implications under a
realist paradigm. The contention of Putnam, of which Braver approves and cites as definitive,
that R2, the correspondence theory of truth, in some form or another, is an essential component
of a thoroughgoing realism, seems far less obviously the case. Understanding the basics of
Heidegger’s views on truth will now allow us to examine his ontological pluralism, itself crucial
to understanding his fundamental reworking of the realist paradigm of Dasein’s access to the
world.
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CHAPTER 2: THE MANIFOLD THING-IN-ITSELF
In this chapter, I examine Braver’s claims about Heidegger’s rejection of realism matrices R3,
Uniqueness, and R4, Bivalence. As a preliminary to these discussions, section 2.1 will outline
Heidegger’s concept of the hermeneutic structure of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world as it differs
from the classical account of representational perception of objects by a subject. With this
understanding, along with the discussions already presented in the first chapter, section 2.2 will
argue that Heidegger rethinks the Kantian Ding an Sich, the ‘thing-in-itself,’ in a distinctive way,
by rejecting R3 Uniqueness and embracing ontological pluralism. Section 2.3 will conclude by
investigating the complex implications of this view for Heidegger’s stance on the principle of
bivalence.
2.1 Anti-Representationalism and the Conditional Access of Being-in-the-World
2.1.1
Heidegger’s account of truth and his rebuff of correspondence theory must be viewed within the
context of his more general critique of representationalism. As we have discussed, truth for
Heidegger does not lie most fundamentally in the correctness of a representational proposition,
but in the self-showing act of an entity upon which any evaluation of propositional correctness
must be founded. Thus, the concept of representational images, upon which most theories of
perception since at least Augustine have rested, is replaced with presentation. The presentation
of the entity that is to be represented in an assertion is a necessary prerequisite for such
representation in the first place, and Heidegger thus provides a theory of what is now often called
direct realism. It is important to note here that a thorough defense of “direct realism” in all its
aspects as a philosophy of perception is somewhat outside the scope of this project.1 Instead, the
following discussion will focus on the way in which Heidegger’s thought, particularly his antirepresentationalism, informs and supports a direct realist view of perception.
In his Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger traces the history of representationalism,
highlighting how epistemological concerns inevitably led to “doubt as to whether our
representations reached the being itself in itself at all and did not rather remain enclosed within
the circuit of their own activity, hence in the realm of the ‘soul.’”2 This skeptical outlook, he
maintains, redefines the prevalence of representations, so that not only judgments and assertions
are thought of as mental images, but perceptions themselves. Since, then, all that we see are just
representations, “thinking” about what we perceive—judging, believing, cognizing in general—
become conceptualized as representational operations performed on other representations:
“Consequently knowledge and assertions consist in the representation of representations and
hence in a combination of representations. This combining is an activity and a process taking
place merely ‘in our consciousness.’”3 Heidegger distinguishes idealism and what he generically
calls “realism” as philosophical attitudes that are not really at odds, but, on the contrary, are
based on the same representational schema:
1
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The doctrine that our representations relate only to the represented, the
perceptum, the idea, is called idealism. The counterclaim, according to which our
representations reach the thing themselves (res) and what belongs to them
(realia), has been called, ever since the advance of idealism, realism. Thus these
hostile brothers, each of whom likes to think himself superior to the other, are
unwittingly in complete accord with regard to the essence, i.e., with regard to
what provides the presupposition and the very possibility of their controversy:
that the relation to beings is a representing of them and that the truth of the
representation consists in its correctness.4
Idealism and representational realism, then, both make the same mistake by starting from a
common point. But he goes on to say that not only do the two theories rest on the common soil
of representationalism, but that, in fact, this sort of “realism” is actually just idealism:
Realism, for its part, is captive to a great error when it claims that even Kant, the
most profound “idealist,” is witness for the defense of realism. On the contrary,
the consequence of Kant’s adherence to the traditional determination of truth as
correctness is simply the opposite, namely that realism, in its determination of
truth as correctness of a representation, stands on the same ground as idealism,
and is even itself idealism, according to a more rigorous and more original
concept of “idealism.” For even according to the doctrine of realism—the critical
and the naïve—the res, beings, are attained by means of the representation, the
idea.5
But Heidegger wants to completely dismantle this paradigm. For him, an entity is not accessed
by means of a representation, if we mean by that term an ‘idea’ or ‘image,’ some tertium quid
that stands between ourselves and the never-glimpsed world behind the curtain. An entity, rather,
is out in the open for direct view. Even in memory, projection, and assertion, that which Dasein
comports itself toward is not a picture of an entity, but the entity itself. The latter case is
particularly important, and we have laid the groundwork for understanding it already in 1.2 when
we discussed how assertions uncover the entities to which they refer. As Mark Wrathall says,
“By reflecting on our experience in hearing an assertion, we recognize that we are never directed
toward or by means of a representational content, but rather directly to the being indicated by the
assertion. Assertions and beliefs do not represent beings in the world, they present them; they
are a way of being oriented within the world so that a state of affairs can show up.”6
Heidegger stresses this point in the example he gives in §44 of Being and Time. There he
argues that, even in assertions, what one is phenomenologically directed toward is that which the
assertion asserts about, not the assertion itself or a picture it conjures. To take it that what the
assertion is about is an image it brings to mind, that image being itself a representation of
something else, is, as he sees it, a grave error, and the prime instance of representationalism run
amok:
Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true
assertion that ‘the picture on the wall is hanging askew.’ […] If he who makes the
assertion judges without perceiving the picture, but ‘merely represents’ it to
4
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himself, to what is he related? To ‘representations,’ shall we say? Certainly not, if
‘representation’ here is supposed to signify representing as a psychical process.
Nor is he related to ‘representations in the sense of what is thus ‘represented,’ if
what we have in mind here is a ‘picture’ of that Real Thing which is on the wall.
The asserting which ‘merely represents’ is related, rather, in that sense which is
most its own, to the Real picture on the wall. What one has in mind is the Real
picture, and nothing else. Any Interpretation in which something else is here
slipped in as what one supposedly has in mind in an assertion that merely
represents, belies the phenomenal facts of the case as to that about which the
assertion gets made.7
The idea that the subject in this example is comporting himself toward a representation reflects,
for Heidegger, an increasing encroachment of representationalism, which only obfuscates the
matters at issue. After all, if we dogmatically assert from the beginning that only representations
are accessed, and that in representing what we are comported toward are representations, we
have not only belied the phenomenological facts of the case, but also, in a sense, cheated. If
one’s definition of re-presentation is so broad and far-reaching that no coherent definition of
presentation can be constructed alongside it, then the “game has been rigged,” so to speak, from
the beginning. That is to say, a “theory” of representation that cannot countenance a theory of
presentation is no theory at all, but a dogma. Heidegger sees this dogma as reaching its apex in
the neo-Kantianism of his time. In History of the Concept of Time, he takes his former teacher,
Rickert, to task for this:
[Rickert] is prevented from seeing the primary cognitive character of
representation because he presupposes a mythical concept of representing from
the philosophy of natural science and so comes to the formulation that in
representing the representations get represented. But in the case of a
representation on the level of simple perception a representation is not
represented; I simply see the chair. This is implied in the very sense of
representing. When I look, I am not intent upon seeing a representation of
something, but the chair. Take for example mere envisaging or bringing to mind,
which is also characterized as a representation of something which is not on hand,
as when I now envisage my writing table. Even in such a case of merely thinking
of something, what is represented is not a representation, not a content of
consciousness, but the matter itself. The same applies to the recollective
representation of, for example, a sailboat trip. I do not remember representations
but the boat and the trip itself. The most primitive matters of fact which are in the
structures themselves are overlooked simply for the sake of a theory.8
Heidegger’s point is not that we never truly represent, but rather that representational theories
have misunderstood the character of representation, such that in representing we comport
ourselves toward representations. But the insights of phenomenology (particularly intentionality)
show, for Heidegger, that in representational acts we are not in fact comporting ourselves toward
a representation, but toward what is represented in the act. Phenomenology provides the tools to
see that in what are traditionally considered “representational acts,” what is laid out for view is
what the representation indicates, not some reified product of the act. Thus, in Heidegger’s
7
8
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phenomenological ontology, presentation becomes the theme of access to entities, rather than the
imagistic scheme of “representation” that dominates neo-Kantian epistemology. The skepticism
which necessarily falls out of the latter, where consciousness always remains trapped in a realm
of its own “mere representations,” is thus overcome. As Heidegger sees it, Husserl’s insights
have demonstrated that this skepticism was, from the beginning, based on a dogmatically
confused phenomenology.
Now that we have clarified the nature of Heidegger’s objection to representationalism,
we can briefly counter a possible argument to Heidegger’s account of truth. One might ask: “But
doesn’t viewing an entity as it is ‘not in itself’ indicate an inadequacy, a failure of
correspondence? Does Heidegger’s theory of truth not then collapse into correspondence
theory?” The answer is not at all, because there is no thing that would correspond to another
thing. To insist that there is would be to again reify the semblance into something other than that
very thing which is shown, to turn it into an image or representation. Phenomenon and
semblance, uncovering and covering over, are rather ways of seeing that which is shown, not
other things altogether, by means of which an underlying thing is glimpsed: “‘Phenomenon,’ the
showing itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered.”9
2.1.2
We have shown that for Heidegger we are not acquainted with entities through another entity, an
interlocutor. That is, we do not view a representation that is adequate or inadequate to the entity
and on that basis have acquaintance, indirectly, with the entity. In an act of representation, we
view the entity itself. However, while access is all the time direct, it is also all the time
conditional. That is, simply because entities are out in the open for viewing does not mean that
we are never in error. This was already a major theme in chapter 1, where the difference between
seeing a thing as it is in itself (uncovering) and as it is not in itself (covering over) was
emphasized.
Error, of course, is the default argument that has historically been offered to motivate
representational philosophies of perception. The fact that we can be deceived must therefore
mean we do not have direct access to the “things-in-themselves.”10 This half-argument, generally
and without further ado, is taken to necessitate the idea that we view images on something like a
mental movie screen. Whether it is the late 19th century neo-Kantian paradigm, the logical
positivism it influenced, with its sense-data theory, or any other latter-day representationalism,
the story is a mere variation on the same theme: “These entities [sense perceptions] […] are
brought in with the implication that whenever we ‘perceive’ there is an intermediate entity
always present and informing us about something else—the question is, can we or can’t we trust
what it says? Is it ‘veridical’?”11 But as J.L. Austin realizes, this is just a set-up, a way of making
it necessarily follow that therefore we never access the things themselves. Pierre Le Morvan also
points to this reification of ‘appearances,’ and the assumptive fallacy on which it is based:
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Since the penny is circular (or of a certain size or color), the proponent of the
argument assumes that, since something appears elliptical (or of another size or
color) to us, that of which we are immediately aware is elliptical (or of that size or
color). The underlying assumption here is that if something appears F to subject
S, then S must be immediately aware of something that is F.12
But Austin himself, and more recently and rigorously, philosophers of perception like Alva
Noë13 have proven fully able to explain error without positing intermediate entities. As Le
Morvan says, all we need to point to in such cases are the conditions of the viewing: “a round
penny may look elliptical (or of another size) from a certain angle because of perspectival
distortion; a brown penny of a certain hue may look to be of a different hue from another angle
for a whole host of possible reasons (lighting effects, contrast effects, etc.).”14 That is, as we
have said, access is all the time direct, but all the time conditional. Everything is dependent upon
the conditions under which the entity is accessed. And since conditional access can account for
erroneous perception, why posit these interlocutor entities?
In asking such a question, we have merely given a heuristic argument along the lines of
the principle of parsimony. But simultaneously, Heidegger provides us with a more positive
argument: any model of correspondence between representation and world already depends upon
the world’s prior disclosure, which “alone lends to propositional correctness the appearance of
fulfilling the essence of truth at all.”15
2.2 Ontological Pluralism and the Thing-in-Itself
2.2.1
We are now prepared to discuss Heidegger’s radical reinterpretation of the ‘thing-in-itself.’ We
have already noted in chapter 1 that Heidegger uses such language as Sich-an-ihm-selbstzeigende, ‘that which shows itself in itself.’ The question we now ask is what relation this
designation has to the Kantian Ding an Sich, the ‘thing-in-itself.’ While for Kant the thing-initself is by its very nature hidden away behind the ‘phenomena,’ or the merely apparent, and
therefore intrinsically impossible to access, for Heidegger essentially any encounter pierces
beyond the veil of “mere appearances” and reaches the “real thing.” Crucially, the “real thing,”
the thing-in-itself, can be reached in a variety of different ways and under a variety of different
conditions.
This reinterpretation of the “in-themselves” of entities is made possible by rejecting
Braver’s R3 Uniqueness, the tenet that “There is exactly one true and complete description of the
way the world is.”16 Unlike with R2 Correspondence (and, as we shall see, R4 Bivalence),
Heidegger does not “pseudo-reject” Uniqueness, but, as I will argue, dismisses it fully, without
any qualification. And rather than entailing any sort of anti-realism, this abolition of Uniqueness
opens the way for a novel view of things-in-themselves and what takes place when Dasein
encounters them.
12
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The first thing to stress is that, for Heidegger, what makes an entity “in itself” has nothing
to do with its isolation from a subject, but rather its being true, in the sense we have defined (of
being-uncovered, being a phenomenon). One would only be inclined to conflate something
being-in-itself with its being in isolation—that is, as it is apart from Dasein—if one were already
acting under the prejudice that the isolated thing has some priority in terms of truth, relative to
the non-isolated thing. But this is perhaps the least established claim in the history of
metaphysics that is at the same time so widely believed. Whether in seeing I interpret the entities
seen (or even represent them), why should we believe the unseen entity is the “real deal” while
the interpreted entity is somehow fake, false, a fiction? Instead, in navigating the world we are
constantly and consistently grasping onto fact-elements of the entities we encounter and bringing
them to the fore, bearing them out in full relief, such that the thing as it is in non-isolation,
despite being accessed conditionally, is nonetheless allowed to be as it is in itself.
If, by arbitrary convention, and without further ado, we identify the term “thing-in-itself”
with the thing independent of us, then there is no argument; for who can argue against
convention which sets itself as its only measure? But the convention only gets off the ground by
way of a hidden premise: that the way entities “really are” is as they are when humans aren’t
around. This premise is perhaps as old as Plato’s allegory of the cave, where the shadows on the
wall are designated false, completely false, mere impressions. In setting “mere impressions”
against the “hidden world” (for Plato, the Forms), and dictating, prima facie, that falsity is the
width and breadth of our lot, we establish a privileging of the “God’s eye view.”
Heidegger turns this paradigm on its head. Firstly, we cannot say that the isolated thing is
truer than the encountered thing, since, for Heidegger, as discussed in chapter 1, there is no truth,
no uncovering, without Dasein. But also, and somewhat more to the point, for Heidegger the
waters of truth and falsity are always mixed; all seeing puts some factual elements of the seen
entity in the foreground at the expense of others. This is all just to say that we don't have access
to the Truth, the pure, unadulterated thing, for no such thing exists insofar as “access” is
concerned. Thus, there cannot be just one “true and complete description of the way the world
is.” No description is complete, and many contradictory descriptions can be true. This is, as
Braver calls it, A3, Ontological Pluralism.
2.2.2
As we discussed very briefly in 2.1.2, error is typically seen as a problem for nonrepresentationalist accounts of perception. But Heidegger says that Dasein, as Being-in-theworld, is fundamentally in the truth, and only on this basis is error possible. Or, to put the insight
another way, as Austin reminds us, “it is important to remember that talk of deception only
makes sense against a background of general non-deception.”17 To use an example Wrathall
favors, suppose I am walking along a road and see a deer some distance in front of me. As I
continue walking, I come to realize I was deceived—the “deer” in fact is only a bush. But can it
not be that in seeing the bush as a deer I have nevertheless grasped onto some element of fact
about the bush? After all, it is true that from my perspective and in these lighting conditions, etc.
the bush is readily taken to be a deer. That is, in fact, something about the bush. And while
certainly the judgment that there was a deer before me was erroneous, the falsity of this
perception is only possible because of an already disclosive (i.e. true) access to my environment,
17
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on some level. That is, it is true of the bush, in such and such lighting, or from this perspective—
that is, given some specification of conditions—that, as a matter of fact, it really does look like a
deer. One can only talk about being deceived into thinking the bush is a deer because there is
some access to the bush, to something true about the bush. Thus, if we think of ourselves as
“reading off” the world, then, in order to “misread,” we have to already suppose that in general
we are actually “looking at the text,” so to speak.
But it is important to note that if (and indeed, because) Dasein is intrinsically “in the
truth,” so too is Dasein intrinsically “in falsity”:
In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the
truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth.’ But only in so far as
Dasein has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so far as entities
within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities, as
possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised.18
Take again the case of the bush that seems like a deer. Something about the bush is uncovered in
such a scenario—that under conditions C it looks like a deer. But so too is it the case that the
being of the bush qua itself is covered over. That is, it is not shown as it is in itself. This should
not be taken as statement of a contradiction, but rather as a statement of the fundamentally
perspectival, non-exhaustive nature of access to entities. As Graham Harman has noticed,19 it is a
fundamental fact for Heidegger that encounter with entities is at all times such that elements of
the entity come into focus while others retreat; something is brought to the fore, but necessarily
at the expense of something else. That is, entities are always uncovered in some respects while
simultaneously covered over in others. As Dahlstrom says:
‘Uncovering’ (Entdecken) and ‘covering up’ (Verdecken) are only meaningful in
reference to one another, and talk of a mere or complete uncovering or covering
up is meaningless. If asserting is a type of uncovering, then it also covers up more
or less. An entity only presents itself in this or that respect, shading, and so on, as
Husserl emphasizes is the case for the perception of material objects.20
None of this should be taken to mean that encounters with an entity are fundamentally selfcontradictory; rather, complete truth and complete falsity are impossibilities, and therefore, it is
incorrect to construe Heidegger as believing that all encounters with entities are at the same time
fully true and fully false. Truth and falsity are, instead, far more exotic specimens. Uncovering
only occurs in some respect or another, and, as a consequent, other respects fall out of view.
Thus, encounters with entities are phenomenologically mutually exclusive. Seeing the bush as a
deer precludes also seeing it as a bush, but both modes of encounter uncover and cover over the
entity in question in different respects. This “seeing as” was also an insight of Wittgenstein’s, as
in the Philosophical Investigations’ famous discussion of a ‘duck-rabbit,’ and both he and Austin
cautioned against the idea that this entails an imagistic (or sense-data) view of perception.
Instead, as Harman says, “Dasein lives in the as-structure and is able to see beings as beings.”21
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2.2.3
As this discussion has hopefully elucidated, phenomenon and semblance, uncovering and
covering over, are not cleanly divided; by their very natures, they bleed into one another.
We can see, then, that Heidegger, in a sense, rejects the ‘Ding an Sich’—if by the term we mean,
as Kant did, that which one could only witness from a “God’s eye view” in a unique, singular,
all-encompassing perspective. For Heidegger, though, there are—there can be—no such
perspectives. As such, there is no single, unique way in which an entity can be in-itself, and
which qualifies as what we could call “objective reality.” Rather, a thing can be in-itself in
myriad ways, each of which is objective reality, and each of which can be viewed perspectivally,
yet truthfully. Because these ways are mutually exclusive, there is no monolithic Truth.
Consider the example Heidegger offers of viewing a city: “A city offers a grand vista.
The view that a being has in itself, and so first can offer from itself, lets itself then be
apprehended at this or that time, from this or that viewpoint. The vista that offers itself alters
with each new viewpoint.”22 That is, each of these viewpoints lets the city be seen, uncovers it,
but simultaneously covers over other aspects. If, for example, one only sees an affluent area of
uptown New York, one is not deceived in the sense that the city remains unseen. But
simultaneously such uncovering is that by which covering over can occur; one would be
deceived if on account of such seeing one takes it to be that this perspective exhausts the city,
that the city as a whole is so affluent: “Along some pathways or other, and on some grounds or
other, we arrive at a view about the thing. We construct an opinion for ourselves about it. Thus it
can happen that the view that we adopt has no support in the thing itself. It is then a mere view,
an assumption. We assume a thing to be thus or thus. Then we are only opining.”23 Therefore,
precisely in uncovering is covering over able to breed. “Wherever there is unconcealment of
beings, there is the possibility of seeming.”24 That is, uncovering is not the simple opposite of
seeming, nor vice versa, but instead the two are inclusive to one another. As we have said,
Dasein is in the truth, and by the same token, in untruth.
Seeming, then, only takes place in the midst of phenomena—falsity and truth are
inextricably intertwined, and to speak of Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth, is
pure fiction. There can be no “total account,” just different accounts, though some hold out the
possibility of perhaps being better than others. Guignon points out that this has historically left
Heidegger open to charges of his being “an antirealist and a pernicious relativist.”25 But, as point
of fact, none of this should be taken to imply some sort of subjectivism or relativism, wherein
truth is dependent merely on one’s attitudes. Just as Heidegger took pains to guard against the
misunderstanding that would have him say there are no entities, no facts, when there is no
Dasein, so too did he take pains against the interpretation that this aspect of his thought promotes
relativism:
Because the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein,
all truth is relative to Dasein’s Being. Does this relativity signify that all truth is
‘subjective’? If one interprets ‘subjective’ as ‘left to the subject’s discretion,’ then
22
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it certainly does not. For uncovering, in the sense which is most its own, takes
asserting out of the province of ‘subjective’ discretion, and brings the uncovering
Dasein face to face with the entities themselves. […] If truth has been correctly
understood, is it in the least impaired by the fact that it is ontically possible only
in the ‘subject’ and that it stands and falls with the Being of that ‘subject’?26
Truth is not measured against Dasein, though Dasein is the necessary precondition for the
existence of truth. And, really, is this perspectival paradigm such a radical notion of truth, error,
and reality? As Austin words it, “[different ways of seeing what is seen] may be due to the fact
that what is seen is seen differently, seen in a different way, seen as this rather than that. And
there will sometimes be no one right way of saying what is seen, for the additional reason that
there may be no one right way of seeing it.”27 In such a light, this view seems rather
commonsensical. As Guignon says:
These various views of the city all reveal different aspects […]. Are the aspects
commensurable in the sense that they can be added together to get one
comprehensive, consistent viewpoint? Perhaps not. […] The fact that we can only
get at incommensurable aspects or perspectives of the city might suggest that we
never really see the city itself. […] But surely this suggestion is absurd. When we
see different aspects of New York, we are not seeing something other than New
York, and we are certainly not seeing something that exists only in our heads. We
are seeing the city.28
And this is exactly Le Morvan’s point when he says, echoing Chisholm’s argument in
Perceiving, that, “there is no more reason to think that perceiving a physical object entails
perceiving all of its parts at once than to think that eating a dinner entails swallowing all of its
parts at once, or visiting London entails visiting all of its parts at once.”29 The privileging of the
“God’s eye view,” from which Uniqueness receives its nourishment, is based merely on an
assumptive abstraction. Taylor Carman sums up how preposterous it is that the term “realism”
has become hijacked by such a dogma:
If realism is understood so as to entail commitment to some such absolute and
authoritative perspective, a God’s eye point of view, a view from nowhere, then I
believe Heidegger is no more a realist than Kant. But then, no one ought to be a
realist in that strong sense, if not because, as Nietzsche famously declared, God is
dead, then at least because the expression ‘view from nowhere’ is a contradiction
in terms. We can reject the notion of a unique, ideal, exhaustive view of the real
as incoherent, that is, without rejecting the notion that occurent entities exist and
have a determinate structure in the absence of any and all views, period. This
more austere ontic realism I want to suggest, is coherent and plausible quite apart
from any commitment to reductionism or the correspondence theory of truth.30
Guignon reiterates this same outlook on a “more austere” realism when he says that, as he sees it,
“Heidegger was never an antirealist and that the ‘relativism’ he embraces is the fairly harmless
26
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sort that anyone who is not in the thrall of some dogma would accept.”31 Heidegger seemed, in
fact, to have grown quite weary of, and even hostile toward, the construal of his philosophy as
relativistic. In the Introduction to Metaphysics he says, rather polemically: “Only all the effete
latecomers, with their overly clever wit, believe they can be done with the historical power of
seeming by explaining it as ‘subjective,’ where the essence of this ‘subjectivity’ is something
extremely dubious.”32 While we can avoid reiterating the antagonistic tone of this passage, the
substance is worth repeating: we do not “subjectivize” our access to the world by viewing
phenomenon and semblance, uncovering and covering over, as two sides of the same coin.
It is hopefully clear at this point that the dogma to which Guignon and Carman referred is
in fact R3 Uniqueness, and further clear that the extent to which it is seen as an essential
component of any thoroughgoing realism is merely a pretension of some realists. The counterconcept to Uniqueness, what Braver calls Ontological Pluralism, is not by necessity an antirealist position, nor does it collapse into relativism.
2.3 Bivalence Failure: The “Regulative Ideal”
2.3.1
If R3 Uniqueness is a dogma, then so too is the idea on which it rests, the idea that says our
access to the world comes in only two flavors—true or false, and nothing else. In the rejection of
“complete truth” and “complete falsity,” we already see Heidegger’s shift away from this tenet,
called the principle of bivalence, which is a semantic relative of the law of excluded middle.
Whereas the latter posits that for any proposition P, P \/ ~P, bivalence posits that for any
proposition P, P is true or not-P is true (TP \/ T~P). The distinction between the two is a subtle
point in the philosophy of logic, and is not crucial here. As such, we will use them both, as
Braver does, when discussing R4 Bivalence.
Michael Dummett first proposed that bivalence is an essential feature of realism as a way
to circumvent unproductive metaphysical debates and instead reframe the issue in purely
semantic terms. Thus, what, metaphysically, is true is not as important as the underlying theory
of truth itself that is accepted:
The primary tenet of realism, as applied to some given class of statements, is that
each statement in the class is determined as true or not true, independently of our
knowledge, by some objective reality whose existence and constitution is, again,
independent of our knowledge.33
Braver picks up on this model and incorporates it as one of his realism matrices, R4 Bivalence,
proceeding to argue that Heidegger rejects it.34 While the contention that Heidegger rejects
bivalence is not inaccurate, there is a preliminary issue that must be raised about the way Braver
sets R4 and A4, the rejection of bivalence, against one another. That is, rejecting R4 does not
entail what Braver’s example of A4 would have us believe. He sets up a false dichotomy, where
rejection of bivalence, ~(TP \/ T~P), is equated to a rejection of the law of non-contradiction, P /\
31
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~P. Braver makes this equivalence when he cites the following passage from Hegel’s Logic as
the paradigm of A4:
If the Object, the product of this transition, be brought into relation with the
notion, which, so far as its special form is concerned, has vanished in it, we may
give a correct expression to the result, by saying that notion (or, if it be preferred,
subjectivity) and object are implicitly the same. But it is equally correct to say that
they are different. In short, the two modes of expression are equally correct and
incorrect. The true state of the case can be presented in no expression of this
kind.35
The key to seeing that this passage amounts to a rejection of the law of non-contradiction, and
not bivalence, is the word “equally.” With the use of this word, Hegel is expressing an
acceptance of the somewhat more radical thesis of dialetheism,36 a logical semantics that claims
both P and ~P can be true at the same time. But there are logics which do not accept dialetheism
while also denying bivalence—any consistent many-valued logic does this. So one can be
committed to a rejection of bivalence without being committed to the claims of dialetheism, the
latter being much more dubious as a realist position.
My contention is that Heidegger’s paradigm is along these lines: he is only rejecting the
law of the excluded middle (or bivalence), and not the law of non-contradiction, and therefore
giving us a “fuzzy” paradigm (as is formalized in fuzzy logic).37 If Heidegger’s rejection of R4
works in this way, then Braver’s example is clearly not applicable to what Heidegger is doing. It
certainly remains a way of rebuffing bivalence, but does not necessitate rejection of the law of
non-contradiction, as Hegel’s passage does.
At the same time, Heidegger’s is not quite a “full-blown” rejection of the excluded
middle; indeed, it remains an important, if naïve, ideal of logic. Instead we are afforded a
“pseudo-rejection,”38 much as was the case with R2 Correspondence. This pseudo-rejection is
twofold in its scope. Firstly, as was stated in 2.1, conditional access to entities means that truth
and falsity go hand in hand. Any perspective on an entity which uncovers it in some respects will
simultaneously cover it over in others. Thus, there is no “complete truth” or “complete falsity” in
35
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under supervaluationism). But his pragmatist leanings seem to preclude it; if all our concepts, or
even a great majority of them, are inherently vague, then, under supervaluationism, all or most of
our assertions are without a truth value. This seems like an undesirable conclusion, not only on
its own (dis-)merits, but also because Heidegger's theory of truth, fuzzy though it is, seems to
entirely preclude it.
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Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. And secondly, our concepts, as approximations toward the world,
are inherently vague; there is always gray area on the boundaries of defining a concept or
category. A Heideggerian view, combining both of these positions, suggests then that a given
assertion has to be evaluated on a scale between truth and falsity, not as simply fully true or fully
false. This is along the same lines as the model that a typical fuzzy logic follows. Though we will
address the issue of vagueness presently, the idea that our categories are “approximations”
toward the world will be fleshed out in greater detail in the following chapter.
2.3.2
Braver summarizes Dummet’s rationale for bivalence as the central tenet of realism as follows:
“Instead of the relatively meaningless and endless metaphysical discussion, we should examine
the much more tangible implications of realism of bivalence: if reality is determinate
independently of us, then propositions will have determinate truth values regardless of whether
we can verify them or not.”39 The problem with the rationale is that there is no reason
whatsoever for agreeing with this conditional, because someone who accepts the antecedent is in
no way obliged to accept the consequent. And critiquing any rejection of the consequent by
simply characterizing the move it as anti-realist just begs the question by accepting the
Dummetian conditional in the first place.
The pragmatist (and Heideggerian) view previously mentioned in 1.3, that the concepts
we use are defined by and involved with collective human practices, generally leads to a
rejection of the consequent in the above conditional. As Braver himself says, the Wittgenstein of
the Philosophical Investigations critiques naïve propositional bivalence by way of an argument
against the idea that when we use language we are following rules.40 Instead, given the pragmatic
situation, we are playing one kind of language game or another, and these language games are
part of a normative social practice. As Lance and Hawthorne summarize Wittgenstein on rulefollowing, “The whole point of the skeptical argument on rule-following in the Philosophical
Investigations is that no account of linguistic competence can be given in terms of explicit rules,
since rules only guide behavior under an interpretation and interpretations are subject to
normative assessment just as much as rules are.”41 Thus, propositions do not have “determinate
truth values regardless of whether we can verify them or not,” because talk of determinate truth
values ignores the deeply social and organic (not rule-based) nature of linguistic competence
formation. Speaking English well does not involve memorizing a set of rules, nor does
interpreting or translating it. The meaning, then, of an English sentence is not a strictly
determinate thing, nor can be its truth value. This kind of argument has proven incredibly
influential in the philosophy of language. At the same time, fuzzy logic has developed in order to
evaluate propositions that make use of vague concepts like ‘heap,’ ‘large,’ ‘bright,’ etc. For
pragmatists, these concepts are far and away the rule rather than the exception.
To clarify: Frege’s statement, which Braver cites, that “the law of the excluded middle is
really just another form of the requirement that the concept should have a sharp boundary”42 is
not disputed on this view. But the point of pragmatists, and those who take fuzzy logic to be
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more than just a peculiar academic deviation from classical logic, is not that it is impossible to
sharpen our concepts. That is, it is not impossible, when I say “the lamp is bright” to whittle
down the categories at play such that one can assign an absolute truth value to the sentence along
the lines bivalence would dictate. The point is rather that sharpening ‘bright’—or, for that matter,
‘lamp’—in this way is purely artificial. To do so would be, in a sense, to create a new concept
altogether from the skeleton of the fuzzy, natural concept ‘bright’ that we use in everyday
language.
If I were to ask you to go into the other room and tell me if the lamp is bright, that which
will absolutely determine your answer is, say, conventions about décor, or practical concerns
about the legibility of a book under the light. By way of these evaluative standards, the answer to
my question may be clear, but that doesn’t mean there’s an easy place to draw the line. When
Frege claims that “a concept that is not sharply defined is wrongly termed a concept,”43 he has
simply failed to notice that this is just not how concepts work in everyday language. To hone the
concept ‘bright’ so that in all cases it is absolutely, unambiguously clear whether the proposition
“the lamp is bright” is true or not, is to engage in an ideal linguistic practice. While such an
enterprise may be illuminating and worthwhile for other reasons, it remains a fact that it is not
the way natural languages actually work.
Instead, we should see bivalence, and the law of the excluded middle, as principles of
logic that are, in a sense, subjunctive—that would pertain under what we might call “ideal
circumstances.” Richard Tieszen describes Husserl’s view of knowledge as one where “a
conception of ideal or maximal truth serves as a regulative ideal, as an ideal or norm toward
which knowledge aims if it is to be more fully determined and perfected.”44 Thus, as a
“regulative ideal,” bivalence splits the world into absolute truth and absolute falsity. But this
regulative ideal cannot be met by human knowledge. Instead, as in Kant, it acts as a guidepost:
One might look at a platonistic view of truth as postulating truth as fully
determinate, complete, perfected. But Kant would say that ‘reason’ (as distinct
from understanding) inevitably leads to such postulation, and that it thereby
provides a standard against which our knowledge is measured at any given time.45
The regulative ideal is just that, an ideal against which example cases can be measured, rather
than something to which they conform, and therefore is not applicable to perspectival encounters
with entities. Likewise, when engaging in discourse, we mold and carve what is seen into
categories that act as linguistic approximations, and here bivalence also fails. So, just like with
Heidegger’s position on R2 Correspondence, this is not so much a rejection of bivalence as an
acknowledgment of its limits.
2.3.3
We have stated that bivalence, for both Husserl and Heidegger, is a “regulative ideal,” and this is
the case on two fronts: firstly, access to entities is always conditional, and secondly, our concepts
are inherently vague. But neither of these, nor the two together, entail that there is no determinate
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reality, no “fixed totality of mind-independent objects” (Braver’s R1 Independence).46 For, as we
have seen, Heidegger accepts that there are definite, determinate facts.
Braver, however, seems to take Heidegger’s views to have such implications. He quotes
Heidegger as saying, as he indeed does in Being and Time, that “any truth whatsoever,”
including those of logic, cannot be true when there is no Dasein. While this is indeed correct of
Heidegger’s philosophy, it is misleading, as chapter 1 made clear. Nothing anti-realist falls out of
Heidegger’s claim that there is no truth when there is no Dasein, since this does not entail that in
the pre-Dasein world there were no facts. Not only is this not entailed by his account of truth, but
Heidegger himself guarded against it, so we cannot construe him as even believing it was a part
of his philosophy. Truth is an event for Heidegger, the unveiling of facts, and such unveiling can
only be done by—or, as perhaps we should say—to Dasein. But facts and entities are not
something that disappear when Dasein does not exist.
Thus, while truth is not a thing that we can simply apply to groups of symbols unless
Dasein exists, fact remains untouched by Dasein’s existence or non-existence. When Dummet
claims then that statements are determined “as true or not true, independently of our knowledge,
by some objective reality whose existence and constitution is, again, independent of our
knowledge,” we can reject this on the grounds that statements are simply not made true
independently of our knowledge. Dasein Being-in-the-world, from which knowledge or
understanding springs, is exactly the prerequisite for truth to occur. But we cannot take from the
idea that descriptions of reality are made true or false dependent on our knowledge (or existence)
that therefore reality is non-existent or has a different constitution dependent on us. The way in
which Heidegger rejects Dummet’s summation of bivalence, the so-called “primary tenet of
realism,” does not imply a rejection of R1 Independence. Nor, by the same token, does it deny
that the world—to be distinguished from language, or descriptions of the world—conforms to the
excluded middle in the sense that it is determinate.47 The excluded middle, and bivalence, fails
when we encounter entities—because our access is necessarily conditional and perspectival, and
therefore steeped in both truth and falsity—and also when we speak about them—because our
concepts are approximations of reality that are inherently vague.
One could, however, continue to press the point of the Dummetian conditional: shouldn’t
the determinateness of reality imply there is in fact a true and complete description of it? That is,
if Heidegger acknowledges a determinate reality, how can he reject Uniqueness? The key is to
realize that in R3 (and the articulation of R4 Bivalence that Heidegger denies) we have moved
from talking about a determinate reality to a complete, determinate, unique description of reality.
And it is precisely in description—even the hermeneutic description that occurs pre-discursively
in perspectival perception—that bivalence fails. It is in “reading off” reality, even when we read
it off well, that we interpret and vagueness takes hold. One can hold, then, that reality is not
vague, but determinate, yet also maintain that our access is always conditioned, and therefore
non-exhaustive, “blunt,” in a way. Accordingly, the concepts we use, and thus the descriptions of
reality from which they are built, are vague.
46
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The point to be stressed here is that R1 Independence should not be taken to already
entail R3 Uniqueness. Nothing about a determinate reality means that mutually exclusive
interpretations cannot simultaneously truthfully bear out that which they describe. Just because
we have inherently perspectival access—simultaneously truthful (uncovering), yet mutually
exclusive perspectival access—doesn’t necessitate a non-determinate reality. And that that
reality is determinate doesn’t mean we have to reify conditional access to it and turn such
perspectival interpretations into “representations.” The thing before me can be interpreted
without falsity as a book; I open it and begin reading the words on the page. Its being a book is
something true about it. But it is also true of the thing that it can be used as a paper weight.
These are two ways of “seeing” the thing, of accessing it as it is in itself. As “paper weight,” it is
no less what it is in itself than as “book.” Nor has anything about the entity changed. That is,
nothing about this modality of multiple “as-structures” implies an indeterminacy of the entity.
2.4 Conclusion
We have discussed in this chapter how Heidegger’s anti-representationalism and rejection of
bivalence in our access to, and articulation of, reality has led to a new view of the thing-in-itself:
entities can by in many different ways, with these modes allowing for the thing to be variously
“as it is in-itself.” The origin of the “as-structure,” in the unmediated understanding of the
categorial, and its relation to the ultimate realism matrix we will consider, R5 Passive Knower,
will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: REALISM WITHIN THE CORRELATION
This chapter will scrutinize the question of whether or not Heidegger’s philosophy supports R5
Passive Knower or A5 Active Knower. Section 3.1 will begin by questioning the reading of
Heidegger as a so-called “ontological idealist,” arguing that the nature of Being simply cannot be
put in such terms, and that the relationship between Dasein and Being is more complex than
simple dependence. Section 3.2 will then attempt to show how Husserl’s insight of the categorial
intuition inspired Heidegger to re-evaluate Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” from an unexpected
direction, yielding a novel view of Dasein as a Passive Knower.
3.1 The “Destiny of Being”
3.1.1
As Braver mentions, many recent Heidegger scholars have argued that Heidegger should be read
as an “ontic realist” but an “ontological idealist.” That is, beings are not dependent on Dasein,
but their Being is. This position has been argued for most emphatically by Taylor Carman1 and
constitutes what is, at this point, likely the standard reading of Heidegger amongst the
philosophical descendents of Hubert Dreyfus or anyone else that takes seriously the idea of
Heidegger as a realist. While Braver argues against this view, denying that Heidegger accepts R1
Independence (ontic realism), I will not focus on debunking that position here. Instead, I will
make the argument that Being should not be read as something that is in any exaggerated sense
dependent on Dasein. That is, while Heidegger does unequivocally state that Being is dependent
on Dasein,2 I believe we should not rush to the easiest, most apparent conclusion about what this
means.
There is, of course, no shortage of passages in Being and Time that express the basic idea
from which Carman’s interpretation is derived. Heidegger says that “Being (not entities) is
something which ‘there is’ [‘es gibt’] only in so far as truth is. And truth is only because and as
long as Dasein is. Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially.”3 Since truth and Being are so
intimately connected for Heidegger, and truth exists only insofar as Dasein exists, then so too “is
there” Being only insofar as there is Dasein. Heidegger expresses this thought in a bit more detail
elsewhere:
If idealism emphasizes that being and Reality are only ‘in the consciousness,’ this
expresses an understanding of the fact that Being cannot be explained through
entities. […] Only because Being is ‘in the consciousness’—that is to say, only
because it is understandable in Dasein—can Dasein only understand and
conceptualize such characteristics of Being as independence, the ‘in-itself,’ and
Reality in general.4
So, Dasein is necessary for Being in the sense that Being is only “in the consciousness.” On the
face of it, this certainly looks like idealism. But consider the passage more closely. Heidegger is
1
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not expressing anything like the Kantian schema where Being is a category of the understanding.
Instead, he is pointing out that the statement “Being ‘is in the consciousness’” means only that
Being is understandable solely by Dasein. But this is a far cry from saying Dasein “creates”
Being or imposes it upon the world. To reduce the “dependence of Being” on Dasein to merely
its reliance on being understood by Dasein is to take the bite out of idealism, so to speak. Rather
than the idea that Being “isn’t” when there is no Dasein, Being retreats into obscurity for all
other entities, and is only opened up for understanding by Dasein. If one reads the above
passage, and the phrase “in the consciousness,” as meaning that Being is, in a sense, a fiction, a
form of consciousness and nothing more, then the entire point of the clarification Heidegger
provides has been lost.
And that counter-attitude, that Being is dependent on Dasein’s Being for its own “Being,”
is to commit a cardinal sin, not only for Heidegger, but for the entirety of the long history of
ontology, from Parmenides to the Medievals. For to speak of Being’s “being” in anything but a
metaphorical way is absolute nonsense. Being is not an entity which could be said to “be” or “not
be.” Any such expression for Heidegger is always false and misleading, though sometimes
linguistically unavoidable. This is not just a matter of formality, but a serious problem, that if
ignored will unsurprisingly lead to the sorts of absurdities like the idea that Being literally is only
so long as Dasein is.
Notably, the German that Heidegger consistently uses reads “‘es gibt’ Sein.”—literally
“‘it gives’ being.” This leads to a possible interpretation here of the ‘there is’ not as a
metaphysical statement about Being “being” or “not being,” but rather an annunciation of
Being—as if to say, “Hark! Being.” Thus, only so long as Dasein is, does Being give itself—or,
only so long as Dasein is, does Being announce itself. While ‘es gibt’ is in colloquial German a
common expression for saying that something exists, we know that taking such a metaphorical
interpretation in reference to Being is nonsense and verboten for Heidegger. However, if we take
the phrase as it literally stands, it says nothing of the sort. Heidegger expressly speaks of the
literal use of the phrase “‘es gibt’ Sein” several times in the “Letter on Humanism”:
In Being and Time (p. 212) we purposely and cautiously say, il y a l’Etre: “there
is/it gives” [“es gibt”] Being. Il y a translates “it gives” imprecisely. For the “it”
that here “gives” is Being itself. The “gives” names the essence of being that is
giving, granting its truth. The self-giving into the open, along with the open
region itself, is Being itself.
At the same time “it gives” is used preliminarily to avoid the locution “Being is”;
for “is” is commonly said of some thing that is, We call such a thing a being. But
Being precisely “is” not “a being.” If “is” is spoken without a closer
interpretation of Being, then Being is all too easily represented as a “being” after
the fashion of the familiar sorts of beings that act as causes and are actualized as
effects.5
——————
But does not Being and Time say on p. 212, where the “there is/it gives” comes to
language, “Only so long as Dasein is, is there [gibt es] Being”? To be sure. It
means that only so long as the clearing of Being propriates does Being convey
itself to man. But the fact that the Da, the clearing as the truth of Being itself,
propriates is the dispensation of Being itself. This is the destiny of the clearing.
5
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But the sentence does not mean that the Dasein of man in the traditional sense of
existentia, and thought in modern philosophy as the actuality of the ego cogito, is
that being through which Being is first fashioned. The sentence does not say that
being is the product of man.6
——————
Being is illumined for man in the ecstatic projection [Entwurf]. But this projection
does not create Being.7
These passages speak for themselves. Despite the fact, though, that the “Letter on Humanism”
was published 18 years after Being and Time, it would be inaccurate to say this was something of
a latter-day contrition by Heidegger. As we saw above, he stresses the same point in History of
the Concept of Time, and even makes it in Being and Time:
Ontically, ‘letting something be involves’ signifies that within our factical
concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is already and in order
that it be such. The way we take this ontical sense of ‘letting be’ is, in principle,
ontological. And therewith we Interpret the meaning of previously freeing
[Freigabe] what is proximally ready-to-hand within the world. Previously letting
something ‘be’ does not mean that we must first bring it into its Being and
produce [herstellen] it; it means rather that something which is already an
‘entity’ must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the
entity which has this Being be encountered.8
This passage strongly suggests firstly, that we do not “bring entities into their Being”—that is,
we do not make entities be or cause them to be. When Heidegger says “something which is
already an ‘entity,’” he is expressly indicating that, in being an ‘entity’ [‘Seindes’] it is
something which, prior to encounter, already is, “has” Being. We cannot then easily separate an
ontic realism from a claim about Being itself. Secondly, the passage indicates that in
encountering we are letting the entity, which already is, show up, let it be. When we “let
something be,” then, we are neither producing the entity nor its being; both the entity and its
being were already lying in wait. What we are doing is allowing some mode of Being for the
entity to express itself, give itself over. Therefore we are, without a doubt, effecting the entity,
and even its Being. When Heidegger says Being depends on Dasein, he does not mean without
Dasein there would be no Being; he means rather that Being relies on Dasein in order to find its
full expression, its ultimate, explicit articulation, and this too opens up ways of Being for the
entity. Thus, “Being comes to destiny in that It, Being, gives itself.”9
3.1.2
We cannot, then, read Being’s “being” only “in the consciousness” as indicating some sort of
idealism. While Heidegger ostensibly expresses a priority of idealism over realism on this issue,
we have to ask whether this is not a caricature of realism, given the way he states it: “But
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[realism] immediately falls short in attempting to explain this reality by means of the real itself,
in believing that it can clarify reality by means of a causal process.”10
But is it really an essential feature of realism that it posits Being as only explicable
through entities? And is it really a feature solely found in idealism that the converse is posited?
That is, is it really charitable or reasonable to uphold that “If what the term ‘idealism’ says,
amounts to the understanding that being can never be explained by entities but is already that
which is ‘transcendental’ for every entity, then idealism affords the only correct possibility for a
philosophical problematic”?11 Heidegger himself seems to answer this question when,
immediately following, he snidely comments, “If so, Aristotle was no less an idealist than
Kant.”12 This remark, though made in passing, seems to indicate a tacit acknowledgment of the
absurdity, and underhandedness, of defining idealism in opposition to realism in this way.
Conversely, what Heidegger posits as a shortcoming of idealism is typically seen to be
one of its defining features: “As compared with realism, idealism, no matter how contrary and
untenable it may be in its results, has an advantage in principle, provided that it does not
misunderstand itself as ‘psychological’ idealism.”13 That is, “if ‘idealism’ signifies tracing back
every entity to a subject or consciousness whose sole distinguishing features are that it remains
indefinite in its Being and is best characterized negatively as ‘un-Thing-like,’ then this idealism
is no less naïve in its method than the most grossly militant realism.”14 But this is what idealism,
particularly transcendental idealism, does. When Kant says that, “the empirical consciousness of
a given manifold of one intuition stands under a pure a priori self-consciousness”15 he is simply
tracing back every object to the subjective, the immanent, and placing its Being, as categorially
grasped, squarely within the realm of self-consciousness.
In idealism, then, Being remains a “psychological” fact, a category of the understanding.
For Heidegger, Being cannot be thought of in this way, as something imposed by the faculties,
but instead must be seen as something already “there,” yet hidden to entities unlike us. When
Heidegger says that Being is “only understandable in Dasein,” he is expressing what is in a
certain sense the opposite of what Kantianism would say: rather than artificially or synthetically
“adding” Being to entities, we are the only entities capable of “seeing” Being and bringing “it”
out into the open for understanding. The origins of this departure from Kant, and how crucial a
role it plays in Heidegger’s philosophy, will be the topic of the next section.
3.2 The Correlation and the Categorial
3.2.1
In his recent book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux has sought to explicate and criticize what
he sees as the anti-metaphysical orthodoxy that has come to prominence since the “back to Kant”
movement of the 19th century. As Meillassoux sees it, the central pillar of this critical
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philosophy, which lies at the heart of both the Analytic and Continental traditions, is what he
calls “correlationism.” He formulates the thesis of correlationism as follows:
By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to
the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered
apart from the other. We will henceforth call correlationism any current of
thought which maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation so
defined.16
Correlationism sees thinking and Being as intrinsically tied to one another, so that any talk of
Being reveals less about Being than it does about thinking. To characterize the correlation
another way, “thought cannot get outside itself in order to compare the world as it is 'in itself’ to
the world as it is ‘for us’, and thereby distinguish what is a function of our relation to the world
from what belongs to the world alone.”17 Instead, any metaphysical endeavor is doomed to be
trapped within the sphere of “cognition about the metaphysical” rather than the metaphysical
itself. This basic idea can be traced back to Berkeley, but it received its most systematic
treatment in Kant, on whose “Copernican Revolution” Meillassoux considers it to rest.
According to Kant’s revolutionary idea, the mind is active in constituting the objects of its
beholding, and therefore “objects must conform to our cognition”18 rather than the other way
around.
Meillassoux’s definition of correlationism, however, is somewhat vague. What, exactly,
do we mean by ‘thinking’ or ‘thought’? If we use these words themselves in a pre-critical sense,
which is entirely unclarified, and which runs the gamut across all sorts of possible activities, we
have only formulated the content of correlationism very imprecisely. Any reaction to
correlationism, therefore, will likewise be unfocused. For instance, by ‘think’ do we mean
‘perceive,’ ‘conceive,’ ‘conceptualize,’ ‘cognize,’ ‘categorize,’ ‘behold,’ ‘observe,’ ‘understand,’
‘comprehend,’ ‘judge,’ ‘reflect upon,’ ‘imagine,’ ‘consider?’ These words and phrases are all
possibilities, but all have slightly different senses, and any sophisticated philosophy will
differentiate at least some of them from others. Kant, for example, distinguishes between
thinking an object and cognizing it.19 If, then, we mean all of these possible activities together,
then we have a definition of the correlation that simply encompasses too much. We need,
instead, to strip correlationism down to its main point and define it accordingly.
Fortunately, the way to proceed in this direction is clear: since correlationism received its
most methodical treatment in Kant, we should look at his insight, his “Copernican Revolution.”
As Meillassoux says, “Not only does it become necessary [in correlationism] to insist that we
never grasp an object 'in itself,’ in isolation from its relation to the subject, but it also becomes
necessary to maintain that we can never grasp a subject that would not always already be related
to an object.”20 But doesn’t this simply seek to capture Kant’s famous remark, that “thoughts
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”21 That is to say, only in the
synthesis of the concepts with the intuitions can understanding come about.
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This proposition has two sides. Firstly, understanding is always understanding of
something—concepts cannot be divorced from intuitions. Secondly, understanding can never
proceed naively, that is, passively, without the application of the categories in a synthetic act.22
Thus, we can never “get outside ourselves” in order to perceive or understand entities in an
unmediated fashion. For Heidegger, this first condition is not merely accepted, but vitally
informs his conception of Being-in-the-world; Dasein cannot simply be separated from that
wherein it factically exists. To conceptualize such a condition of Dasein’s Being is to, quite
simply, think of Dasein not as Dasein, not as the kind of entity which it fundamentally is, and
instead to abstract it, erroneously, as an isolated subject. As Wittgenstein famously said, “An
inner process stands in need of outward criteria.”23 Heidegger’s point is similar: Dasein is
fundamentally already in the midst of things, embedded in a world.
But as I will argue, for Heidegger, following Husserl, the second condition of
correlationism, while accepted in its essential makeup, is fundamentally flawed in its Kantian
interpretation. The way in which Husserl’s phenomenology rethinks the idea that there can be no
intuitions without concepts, and how that profoundly affected Heidegger’s thinking, leads to a
radical reversal of the tables on the spirit—though technically not the letter—of correlationism.
3.2.2
In History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger notes that, as far as he is concerned, Husserl’s
phenomenology has three fundamental insights which are intimately connected with each other:
intentionality, the categorial intuition, and the true sense of the apriori. While their connection
with each other merits a cohesive approach to any analysis of these insights, the categorial
intuition in particular has direct bearing on the issues laid out in 3.2.1, and therefore we will
focus primarily on it. Understanding the fact that Heidegger sees the categorial intuition as
representing a momentous shift away from the Kantian paradigm will help us to illuminate the
way in which phenomenology dramatically alters the spirit of correlationism.
The origin of the insight lies in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, where, in an oft-cited
passage he proclaims that:
Not in reflection on judgments, nor even upon fulfillments of judgments, but in the
fulfillments of judgments themselves lies the true source of the concepts State of
Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense); not in these acts as objects, but in the
objects of these acts, do we have the abstractive basis which enables us to realize
the concepts in question.24
That is, concepts do not first arise in operations of reflection upon intentional acts, but in the
primary intentional acts themselves. In an act of perception, for example, seeing an entity does
not mean synthesizing the purely sensual intuition with an apriori category of understanding,
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like Being, in a separate act. Instead, the category itself is already presented in the original act.
He goes on to provide the example of seeing an aggregate of entities:
An aggregate, e.g., is given, and can only be given, in an actual act of assembly,
in an act, that is, expressed in the conjunctive form of connection A and B and C. .
. But the concept of Aggregate does not arise through reflection on this act:
instead of paying heed to the act which presents an aggregate, we have rather to
pay heed to what it presents, to the aggregate it renders apparent in concreto, and
then to lift the universal form of our aggregate to conceptually universal
consciousness.25
Categories, then, are themselves objects of intentional acts, not modifications upon those acts.
And thus, intuitions are inherently categorial. If we then take the Kantian insight and argue that
there are no intuitions without concepts, Husserl would not disagree. But it is imperative to note
how this is a robust departure from Kantianism. The categorial is not a psychical process or
element that is imposed upon the ‘sensible manifold.’ As Sheehan says, “For Kant, categorial
intuitions are impossible, since the categories of the understanding function merely to bring the
hyletic data into categorial form, such that the object known is posited in a synthesis of intuition
and concept.”26 For Husserl, on the other hand, intuitions are not fully characterized simply by
their sensuousness, but, as we have said, must be assessed as inherently categorial. What
Heidegger picks up on in this novel doctrine of phenomenology is that, as László Tengelyi says,
“It is part and parcel of this view to maintain that the categories have nothing to do with these
acts, but they relate […] to their objective counterparts.”27 Heidegger himself speaks to this:
One sees in the antithesis of the two kinds of intuition [sensuous and categorial] a
recurrence of the old contrast of sense and understanding. If one adds to this the
conceptual pair of form and matter, the issue may be laid out in the following
fashion: Sensuousness is characterized as receptivity and understanding as
spontaneity (Kant), the sensory as matter and the categorial as form. Accordingly,
the spontaneity of understanding becomes the formative principle of a receptive
matter, and in one stroke we have the old mythology of an intellect which glues
and rigs together the world’s matter with its own forms. Whether it is
metaphysical or epistemological as in Rickert, the mythology is the same.
Categorial intuition is subject to this misunderstanding only as long as the basic
structure of intuiting and of all comportments—intentionality—is not seen or is
suppressed. The categorial ‘forms’ are not constructs of acts but objects which
manifest themselves in these acts.28
But in pointing out that the categorial forms are objects rather than traces of the subject, the
categorial intuition represents for Heidegger “a paradigm of phenomenological proximity to the
‘things themselves.’”29 Heidegger continues the above passage by stating, in no uncertain terms,
this profoundly anti-idealist position:
They [the categorial forms] are not something made by the subject and even less
something added to the real objects, such that the real entity is itself modified by
25
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the forming. Rather, they actually present the entity more truly in its ‘being-initself.’30
But Heidegger goes further, identifying this insight as a bludgeon against idealism, particularly
Kant’s sophisticated transcendental idealism:
Today we are in a position to move against idealism precisely on this front only
because phenomenology has demonstrated that the non-sensory and ideal cannot
without further ado be identified with the immanent, conscious, subjective. This is
not only negatively stated but positively shown; and this constitutes the true sense
of the discovery of the categorial intuition […].31
So, contrary both to the earliest forms of logical positivism—which attempted to reduce all talk
to sense data talk—and Kantianism (as well as neo-Kantianism)—which says the category is
applied in a synthetic act of the faculties—phenomenology, as a result of the insight of the
categorial intuition, holds that the categorial forms are intrinsic to intuition. Therefore, they are
impossible to reduce to sensuousness or to identity with the subjective. In place of these critical
philosophies, then, phenomenology holds out the promise of being able to describe a
“categorially charged facticity.” In his book tracing Heidegger’s thought leading up to Being and
Time, Kisiel notes the young phenomenologist’s motivations for turning away from neoKantianism precisely on this issue. In direct opposition to a neo-Kantian critical philosophy that
shuns metaphysics, phenomenology provides a legitimate basis for speaking metaphysically
(although certainly not in a freewheeling, pre-critical manner). As Heidegger sees it, that
legitimate basis rests on phenomenology’s novel insights, which identify not only sensuous, but
categorial facticity: “That the differentiations of meaning stem directly from the domains [of
reality] themselves (implying that they are already ‘categorially’ structured, that they therefore
need only to be ‘read off’ from such ‘facticities,’) already amounts to a ‘hermeneutics of
facticity’ ensuing from the young Heidegger’s commitment to Aristotelian-scholastic realism.”32
While this passages from Kisiel’s book focuses on the Heidegger of nearly a decade
before Being and Time, it is impossible to dismiss this predilection as a naïve soirée of
Heidegger’s youth. At the time History of the Concept of Time was written years later (1925,
only two years before Being and Time), Heidegger himself puts the categorial intuition in such
terms as its possible impact on the problem of universals.33 It is clear that the Heidegger of Being
and Time continued to be fascinated by the groundbreaking insight of the categorial intuition and
the new, anti-Kantian direction it afforded philosophy in his time. When Kisiel asks, “How do
we know that there are different domains of reality? How are such differentiations articulated?”
the response is that, “The young Heidegger’s answer is, in its simplicity, a paragon expression of
the basic phenomenological conviction in the possibility of description: such differentiation can
only be ‘read off’ from the reality itself.”34 And this is really no different a conviction than when
Heidegger declares in Being and Time that “only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.”35
Kant’s so-called “realism,” that conceptualizes the noumenon (despite its unknowability)
as a vast swath of undifferentiated “stuff,” is diametrically opposed to the authentic realism
30
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Heidegger sees phenomenology as opening up. In Graham Harman’s words, echoing
Heidegger’s critique of the “old mythology” of the constructive intellect, “To speak of some raw,
dough-like matter that would then be shaped into objects by categorial intuition is to retreat into
a distinction between sensibility and understanding that Husserl’s Second Investigation aimed to
destroy.”36 Indeed, this criticism of the view of reality as a homogenous mush is, I believe, a
recurring theme throughout Heidegger’s corpus—from his earliest days, which Kisiel chronicles,
all the way to his critique of modern technology as an “enframing” of the world into
undifferentiated raw material simply “on hand,” waiting to be processed and refined by us into
form.
We see then not only how profound a departure from Kant the categorial intuition in fact
is, but that Heidegger saw it precisely as that. Braver summarizes the idealist “Copernican
Revolution” by stating that “Kant’s anti-realism begins from his rejection of any such access [to
reality as it is], since all contact with the world bears the imprint of mental activity.”37 For
Heidegger all contact with the world indeed bears the imprint of the categorial forms, but only
because the categorial forms are already “out there,” so to speak—independent of Dasein. There
is no room for “mental activity,” not only because it is made unnecessary by the categorial
intuition but because, as Heidegger believes, understanding is decidedly pre-cognitive; for
Heidegger it is not, as it is for Kant, the “faculty of Cognitions.”38 So contrary to Kant, and in the
spirit of Husserl, understanding is not born out of a synthetic act. But contrary to both Kant and
Husserl, neither does it have anything to do with intuitions or consciousness in any thick,
cognitivist sense.
We should, therefore, temper our understanding of Heidegger’s approving view of the
categorial intuition with the fact that he is not without his own criticisms of the notion. However,
Heidegger’s objections have to do with the ‘intuition’ in ‘categorial intuition,’—that is, of
Husserl’s quite traditional conception of intentional acts directed toward present-at-hand
objects—rather than the idea of the categorial belonging to pre-judgmental or pre-inferential
encounter with entities. This break with Husserl stems from Heidegger’s critique of
intentionality, the first insight of phenomenology upon which the categorial intuition is founded.
In place of intentionality, Heidegger places care.39 Because Dasein is not a subject indifferently
perceiving objects and their properties, it cannot be thought of as intentionally directed to things
in isolation from everything else, but rather concernfully comported toward a holistic world full
of pre-existing significance, which is the character of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Care or, as
Dreyfus puts it, “intentionality without self referential mental content” is the primary way of
Dasein’s being, “characteristic of the unimpeded mode of Dasein's everyday activity, whereas
mental-state intentionality is a derivative mode […].”40
The upshot is that, despite his criticisms of the concept of ‘intuition,’ Heidegger approved
of the anti-Kantian flavor of the breakthrough that was the categorial intuition, as Taylor Carman
explains:
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[…] far from representing a full-fledged endorsement of Husserl’s position, I
believe [Heidegger’s qualified approval of the categorial intuition] represents
instead a merely negative or oblique point against the competing intellectualist
assumption of the neo-Kantians that all our experience of the world is structured
by concepts and judgments. What Heidegger liked in Husserl’s theory, then, had
nothing to do with the supposed primacy of intuition, but lay rather in the idea
that our understanding of being—not just existence, but also predication and
identity—is something essentially nonconceptual, prior not just to reflection and
introspection, but even to the formation of judgment and propositional thought.41
But Carman has here raised a question about the subtle distinction between the categorial forms
and the concepts or categories proper. If our understanding of being is essentially nonconceptual,
inherently unmediated by categories, yet the very insight which tells us this is the categorial
intuition, what is the relationship between the categorial and the categories? We will turn to this
question presently.
3.2.3
According to Husserl, the categorial forms are objects of intentional acts. What then is their
relationship to other objects of these acts? What relation does the categorial form subsisting in
the chair have to the sensuous character of the chair? In a rather Aristotelian sense, Heidegger
specifically refers to the categorials as being “in” the entity: “The discovery of the categorial
intuition is the demonstration, first, that there is a simple apprehension of the categorial, such
constituents in entities which in traditional fashion are designated as categories […].42 What then
is the relationship between the categories and the categorial forms? Kisiel indicates that
Heidegger, as the above quote might imply, distinguished them during the lecture courses on
which History of the Concept of Time is based. On Kisiel’s reading, the categorials are not
categories qua categories. That is, they are entirely pre-linguistic, and so entirely nonpropositional:
I have underscored these two terms [‘categorial’ and ‘categories’] because student
notes indicate that Heidegger highlighted their distinction in his summary review
of the lecture hour. The basic point is that categories are already ‘seen’ in
perception, for example, though not as categories but such that the simple
perception of an object is in its way absorbed and engrossed in categorial
apprehension. Categorial intuition here is intuition of that which is then
conceptually grasped as a category. There is therefore a distinction between the
categorial, that which can eventually be grasped as a category, and the category
as a concept. The distinction is important in understanding in what way the
discovery of the categorial intuition provides the basis for research into the
categories and apriori structures of experience.43
Categories, as conceptual constructs, then, are derived from the categorial forms which are
already presented in simple intuitions. The categorials, then, are in a strong sense, ineffable. As
soon as one begins to articulate the categorial, to state it and so linguistically manipulate it, it
41
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must be transposed into a category, a concept. And because the categorials are fully “articulated”
in the world, while, as was argued in 2.3, the categories are inherently vague, we can see how
categories are Dasein-dependent “approximations” toward the categorial forms that the
categorial intuition demonstrates independently subsist.
Linguistic representations, then, “get at” reality, but, of course, only conditionally. This
conditionality is twofold, and echoes the twofold nature of conditionality outlined in 2.3.1.
Firstly, any uncovering of an entity simultaneously covers it over in some other respects, since
access is perspectival; with regard to the categorial forms we can say that, in any encounter,
some categorial forms that subsist in the entity come to the fore while others retreat. For no
entity is exhausted by just one categorial, in just the same way that, obviously, more than one
concept can describe a given entity. And secondly, concepts, as human constructs that are
approximations from categorial forms, can only be finitely articulated, and so are inherently
vague. But in moving from categorial to category, we add nothing, nothing whatsoever, to the
original intuition. On the contrary, we are only subtracting. In just the same way, then, that an
assertion represents the world (in the phenomenological, not imagistic sense), so too does a
category represent the categorial. In fact, these two claims point to precisely the same
phenomenon, since assertions are composed of categories, and the world is composed of the
categorial.
Now, there is at least one major objection to the interpretation I have outlined here, that
there is a distinction between the categories and the categorial forms, and that we “see” the
categorials, subsequently approximating them into the categories proper. This objection forms
the basis for the argument that Heidegger was a linguistic idealist, as has most forcefully been
promoted by Cristina Lafont.44 Certain slogans peppered throughout Heidegger’s career seem to
imply such a linguistic idealism: in History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger says that “we do
not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter.”45 Later in his
career, after the so-called turn in his thought, Heidegger will infamously, and more than once,
claim that “language is the house of being.” Such phrases certainly seem to contradict what I
have argued in this chapter, that the categorial forms hold primacy and that the categories, which
make up language, are there derived. These pithy slogans seem, instead, to inextricably link
Dasein’s understanding (Verstand) with discourse (Rede).
However, Heidegger also seemingly contradicts these sentiments. He says,
“Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action of
circumspective concern—laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, ‘without wasting
words’. From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that interpretation is
absent.”46 This passage seems instead to caution that understanding is indeed separable from
discourse in Heidegger’s phenomenology.47 While this may simply be an inconsistency on
Heidegger’s part, Wrathall has argued that, contra Lafont, the supposedly “idealist” slogans do
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not represent anything of the sort. His argument has two components. Firstly, he says that the
early Heidegger, who says that we “see what one says about the matter,” is referring to Dasein’s
inauthentic mode of Being.48 This contention seems to find support in the fact that Heidegger
says we see what “one says”, invoking Das Man, or the collective, inauthentic Being-with-others
that levels off all experience to the same homogeneity. In inauthenticity, idle talk takes hold,
warping both genuine understanding and genuine discourse. By contrast, “Authentic contact with
the world, of which we are capable, is decidedly not cut to the measure of what we are able to
say about the entities we encounter.”49 And this is in fact the promise that phenomenology holds
out, of being able to cut through the layers of conceptual (that is to say, not categorial) baggage
that the history of philosophy has laid on top of the phenomena.
The second thrust of Wrathall’s argument consists in clarifying the later Heidegger, who
called language the “house of being.” The essence of his argument lies in the fact that the later
Heidegger used ‘language’ to denote something entirely different from that to which he earlier
referred. For the later Heidegger, “the essence of language cannot be anything linguistic.”50
Rather, language is, oddly, pre-linguistic, and consists in the “deeper, background phenomenon
of a preverbal articulative gathering of meanings.”51 Wrathall meticulously traces the
development of Heidegger’s thoughts on language from mere verbal signage to what he sees as
its more originary foundation in this constitutive web of meaningfulness.
The later Heidegger, then, to put it simplistically, moves ‘language’ from the categories
to the categorials—true language is the ineffable background from which what we commonly
call ‘language’ then springs. Philipse characterizes the relationship between the background
categorials and the foreground categories: “the world as that in which we are involved is
meaningful independently from language. World is characterized by holistic significance
(Bedeutsamkeit) and language can be used for articulating pre-existing meanings.”52 But here,
according to Wrathall, Philipse is using the earlier Heidegger’s narrow understanding of
language. In the later Heidegger, ‘language’ instead designates Bedeutsamkeit, the “categorially
charged facticty” itself. As we have seen, the pre-existing significance that constitutes the world
impresses upon Dasein, not vice versa, and thus Dasein does not actively constitute its world.
3.2.4
As Meillassoux defines it, correlationism champions the idea that “Everything is inside because
in order to think anything whatsoever, it is necessary to 'be able to be conscious of it', it is
necessary to say it, and so we are locked up in language or in consciousness without being able
to get out.”53 But what happens when we do not presuppose that consciousness imbues the world
with the conceptual and the meaningful, but that, in a radical sense, entities are already rich with
categorial meaning?
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I believe this is the view Heidegger sees the categorial intuition as opening up: a sort of
realism within the correlation. If we take the Kantian dictum then that “intuitions without
concepts are blind,” we can appropriate it in a way that technically remains true to it, yet
simultaneously undermines the spirit that motivates every historical formulation of
correlationism. Indeed, intuitions are always conceptual, but this is not a fact about
transcendental faculties of understanding, but a fact which states that the world is already
radically conceptual, in a sense. In actual fact, there are no concepts qua concepts in the world,
certainly not linguistic concepts. Instead, the world is radically content-rich, conducive to being
taken up by ‘acts of ideation’ into conceptual representation. The categorial is already “out
there”—but not qua the categories. ‘Chair’ for example, is a concept, a human category. As we
outlined in chapter 1, ‘chair’ as such then is embedded in Dasein’s collective social facticity. But
it approximates (failure of bivalence) the categorial that is already subsistent “out there”; it
provides us not an image of the categorial, but the conditions for either bearing out the categorial
world (as in the hermeneutic understanding that comprises Being-in-the-world), or pointing it out
(discourse).
If we accept, then, a “categorially charged facticity,” and reject the idea of an intellect
that “glues and rigs the world’s matter with its own forms,” we can hardly, then, speak of an A5
Active Knower, one of Braver’s anti-realism matrices. The paradigmatic expression of A5,
unsurprisingly, comes from Kant’s first Critique: “The order and regularity in the appearances,
which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had
we not ourselves, or the nature of the mind, originally set them there.”54 But, as we have seen,
what Heidegger takes away from the categorial intuition is in direct opposition to this. We can,
and do, find order and regularities, not because we introduce them, but because they are already
subsistent and encountered in any comportment. They cannot be reduced to sensuous intuitions,
nor to the realm of a constituting subjectivity.
3.3 Conclusion
As we have seen, the profound insights of phenomenology are precisely that by which Heidegger
rejects the Kantian paradigm of A5 Active Knower. Instead, he sees phenomenology, in noticing
the true origin of the categories, as affirming the correlationist motto that “intuitions without
concepts are blind” while simultaneously debunking Kant’s “Copernican Revolution.” This sort
of realism, then, which takes place within the correlation, nevertheless breaks outside of its
confines by dramatically relocating the origins of the conceptual, and therefore the meaningful
and the significant, taking them out of the intellect and situating them firmly in the world itself.
The world of categorial forms and modal possibilities is not constituted by us, but is already
extant, and presents itself as available in such terms. Only by abstraction could it seem
otherwise.
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CONCLUSION
I have attempted to show, by analyzing the relation between the realism matrices Braver lays out
and Heidegger’s thought, that the latter cannot be seen as anti-realist. While Heidegger rejects
R2 Correspondence, R3 Uniqueness, and R4 Bivalence, it has been my intention to show that
none of these matrices constitutes an essential component of a thoroughgoing realism. On the
contrary, they all constitute a dogmatic way of viewing realism, a naïve formulation of it that
should not be taken as exhaustive of its possibilities.
I have also attempted to show that, in the cases of R2 Correspondence and R4 Bivalence,
Heidegger’s is not a comprehensive rejection. He does not deny that correspondence can occur,
but rather denies that it is the most fundamental characterization of truth— “truth” as a
phenomenon, lies at a deeper level, on which correspondence is based. Likewise, the rejection of
bivalence is somewhat nuanced; while bivalence itself, as a semantic principle, does not hold,
this does not entail that the world is indeterminate or metaphysically vague. Instead, our
encounters with the world do not divide up neatly into “truth” and “falsity,” since uncovering an
entity in some way or other necessarily results in covering up other things about it. In addition,
whenever we speak about the world—that is, describe it in assertions—we make use of concepts
which are inherently vague because they only approximate the determinate nature of the world.
Thus, I have characterized Heidegger’s position towards R2 and R4 as pseudo-rejections,
because he denies their centrality rather than their possibility—as is the case of R2—or their
ultimate validity as descriptions, rather than their efficacy as “regulative ideals”—as with R4.
On the contrary, Heidegger wholly rejects R3 Uniqueness, and I believe this is the crux
of the issue. I have attempted to show that R3 is a central assumption of some forms of realism,
but that its rejection, counter to the claims of many in the history of philosophy, does not entail
anti-realism. Instead, Heidegger is able to construct a novel, plausible, and—dare I say—
commonsensical direct realism from its ashes. This direct realism asserts that we do not interface
with the world by means of representations or any other form of intermediate entities, but that we
conditionally access entities themselves. This conditional access means that our encounters with
entities never exhaust them, their Being or their possibilities-for-Being, but that this does not
disallow genuine contact with their Being.
Ultimately, I argue that despite these rejections (or pseudo-rejections) of the three
matrices R2, R3, and R4, Heidegger has not only implied nothing anti-realist, but has at the same
time provided a new way of characterizing R5 Passive Knower. If we do not look at truth as a
correspondence relation, but as the prior openness of Dasein to the world, then it is easy to see
that Dasein, even when in error, is always related directly to the world, has access to it. From this
we see that truth is not always something which is strictly bifurcated against falsity, but that the
two occur in tandem, always fused in some ratio as we navigate the world, and therefore no
access to the world, nor any conceptual description of it, can be the one and only Truth. Indeed,
the world is disclosed in a variety of different ways, under different circumstances and
conditions, and in each case this is the event of truth, the uncovering of entities and their Being.
We are thus Passive Knowers, who are not bound by the constraints of an apriori ordering
intellect but, on the contrary, are always getting outside ourselves to the things themselves. This
getting to the things themselves occurs in the categorial apprehension of entities in the world—
seeing them as this or that, always in ways that bring out the entities in one direction or another
but disguise them in other ways. In doing so we do not view “images” of entities, but the entities
themselves, as they are in themselves—their very own capabilities, possibilities, and modes of
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Being. Despite, then, the rejection of the other matrices, I believe in the end that Heidegger’s
philosophy is robustly realist, in that it roundly rejects the Kantian paradigm of the Active
Knower and replaces it with a sophisticated, rather than naïve, brand of direct realism, of Passive
Knowing, which can both account for error and can storm the arguments of transcendental
idealism’s conceptualism.
For Heidegger, such an overcoming of the Kantian picture, which closes off human being
from the world, and places it solely within its own solipsistic realm, was only possible through
the most extreme form of such transcendentalism. Husserl’s phenomenology, in “bracketing” the
question of the Being of entities, reducing Being itself to a mere correlate of consciousness,
opened the door for insights which, I believe, Heidegger saw as undermining the very starting
point which led to them. The “hermeneutic circle” of phenomenology, then, proceeded from a
profoundly transcendental position, a position necessary in order to clarify the notion of a pure
phenomenological seeing, to get, as the rallying cry goes, “to the things themselves!” But in
working from that position, that starting point, phenomenology overcame in Heidegger’s
philosophy the flaws that characterized its Husserlian formulation, with its idealist presumptions.
But rather than a weakness of phenomenology as a method, I believe this hermeneutic
circle characterizes its strength. This process is much like that which occurs in the natural
sciences, where a starting point that is generally “on the right track” manages to perform,
through accumulation of data, successive rounds of descriptive and explanatory purification.
Ultimately, the starting point, in accordance with a worthwhile methodology, yields insights that
clarify the flaws in the starting point itself. This process repeats, with each iteration closing in
more closely on the set of facts in question. Husserl’s version of phenomenology, as Heidegger
saw it, continued to harbor traces of the Modernist tradition, but itself contained the
methodological power to ferret out those traces. The categorial intuition, as one of its central
insights, moved against Kantianism, but in doing so also laid the groundwork, in pointing out a
“categorially charged facticity” for moving against problems with the notions of intentionality,
intuition, and the subject-object paradigm itself; the insight thus acted as a springboard for
Heidegger’s critique of the subject-object model, and the priority of the present-at-hand mode of
entities.
Phenomenology thus lives up to Husserl’s hope of a rigorous methodology of philosophy,
analogous to the methodology of the natural sciences. But the consummation of phenomenology
as a worthwhile method of inquiry is only possible on the basis of a “hermeneutic circle” of
successive clarification. In positing the least metaphysical (or, even stronger, the most antimetaphysical), of methods, which brackets not only beings but Being itself, phenomenology
attained the insights Heidegger recognized as its most profound—among them the thoroughly
anti-Kantian categorial intuition. These insights, however, moved at the same time against the
spirit of this bracketing which birthed them, the spirit of this radical anti-metaphysicalism; thus,
Heidegger’s appropriation of ontology as a pressing area of inquiry. Only by going through the
least ontological presuppositions could the question of ontology be reawakened. It is only by
way of the most conservative inward methodology, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology,
that, as I believe Heidegger saw it, we gain the tools for a legitimate, post-critical outward
inquiry. It is only by bracketing the world that we thus achieve the ability to return to it.
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